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With respect to the growing concern of tournament literature, I am going to further 
analyze tournament model in several aspects. The primal question raised is: how is the 'quit-
inducing' tournament adopted when there is firm specific human capital incurred in 
t 
employed labours? 
Specific human capital is a productive investment in the sense that its accumulation 
requires a current reduction of output but it increases future output. However, tournament 
separates workers into winners and losers by offering a wage gap. Since the greater the wage 
gap, the greater the induced incentive. Finns will have every incentive to widen the gap. 
Then the most profitable action logically is to reduce the losers’ wage. However, workers 
广， 
with specific human capital facing a low wage will be more likely to quit and this imposes 
a loss to the firms. That means, firms have to balance the two contradictory effects. 
Different tournament contracts will be discussed in detail in chapter 11. A major finding is 
that the choice of when the tournament be held depends on the technology of specific 
human capital accumulation process. Advanced technology will favour delayed tournament 
and vice versa. Another related answer of the primal question is the existence of an optimal 
labour size. When labour size is a choice factor to firms, finns maximising profit will choose 
a contract in order to maintain the optimal worker size. However, any quitting of workers 
will incur a higher hiring cost of labour. This idea is similar to Hart's (1984). In face of 
this, again, firm acts in order to balance the positive incentive effect of tournament and 
negative hiring cost incurred. 
In realicy，different workers (contestants} and promotion size are actually important 
factors determining the structure of tournament However, these are ignored in many 
literatures. In chapter III, a simple setting of incentive tournament with different promotion 
classes and different contestant sizes are considered. In which, the theoretical prediction of 
the equilibrium effort profile is concave and symmetric at the mean. There is no unique 
relation of changes in optimal effort with respect to the contestants' and promotion sizes in 
all levels of efforts. To validate the predictions made in chapter IV, experiments on the 
related theories are conducted. Although experiment is quite new in the field of economics, 
experiment of tournament model was first done by Bull, Schotter & Weigelt (1987). The 
study here is a significant modification and enrichment of their work. 19 hypotheses are 
tested. However, the experimental results are not very satisfactory. The potential missing 
assumptions may be risk aversion and winning satisfaction which is significant especially at 
low level of promotion size. 
Although tournament is quite new and not a complete explanation of labour contract 
in reality, it is applicable to various environments and can explain how incentive can be 
enhanced under asymmetric information. 
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From the very beginning of the literature of labour economics, finding the prevailing 
wage(s) in an economy has been the main concern. Neoclassical economists provide a very 
neat hut crude claim on the equality between marginal product of labour (MPL) and w^age. 
However, Keynesians believe in noneqiiality. In recent development, micro-analysis of the 
related problems has been given more and more attention, A large number of studies on 
explaining the discrepancy between MPL and wage under micro-analysis emerge. Among 
them, those on the internal labour market (ILM), which is internal to firm and is not subject 
to the influence of the "external" market，are a significant area of study. 
In the literature of ILM’ using tournament model(s) to explain wage contract and 
even wage profiles in reality appears in the last ten years. It not only gives hint on the 
deviation between MPL and wage, but also provides another explanation on the incentive 
and promotion schemes and hierarchical structure in a new perspective. Hence，in section 
LB., emphasis is put on the relation of tournament and the three areas mentioned above. 
Some comparison between tournament and other theories will be made. As an ending, 
relation of specific human capital and the three areas will be introduced. 
LB, Tournament as an incentive device ‘ 
…‘………The value of a finn as “an j^conorrdc.organization —was .pointed, out by Alchian cmd.— 
Demsetz (1972). However, they over-emphasized the efficiency of firms and ignored the 
complexity of incentive problem of workers (especially of team-workers). They claimed that 
paying monitors residuals of earning will solve the incentive problem. In fact, this method 
2 
was not sufficient and practical to reduce moral hazard problem. Tournament is one way 
to solve this principal-agent(s) (P-A) problem. 
With the uncertain relation between ex ante effort and ex post output, agents will have 
t 
no incentive to do their best if they are compensated only by a fixed payment. This moral 
hazard problem exists in various environments such as under imperfect observation of agents' 
effort or non-verifiable exogenous output shocks. Optimal wage contract and its associated 
characteristics were derived and discussed by many economists such as Ray Rees (1987), 
Groves (1973), Harris & Raviv (1978) and Grossman & Hart (1983). What they mentioned 
was a contract depending on observable output. (Linear or non-linear) piece-rate is one 
example. In general, first-best solution can only he achieved when both optimal incentive 
and optimal risk-sharing conditions are attained. When either party is risk-averse, a higher 
payment is needed to compensate him/her, given other things constant Note that the P-A 
problem was even extended to many aspects. Groves analyzed a team (or multiagent 
situation) and Harris & Raviv considered the information acquired during the interaction 
between principals and agents. 
A rank-order tournament is a way to solve the P-A problem. It is a contract with 
only a limited number of wage levels^ ( or prizes). Relative performance rather than 
absolute performance determines who wins or loses and receives different payment From 
an information point of view, this is of course a loss because the information on different 
…absolute performances is ignored.�However，from an incentive-inducing point of view, this 
is effective, 
1 Although it is possible to model the tournament with n prizes, it is unrealistic to put 
this as a general case. t 
3 
I.B.I.) 
There are several authors comparing tournaments and piece-rate wage contracts in 
various aspects. In the early work of Lazear & Rosen (1981)，the comparison was carried 
J 
out between a tournament contract and a linear piece-rate contract under a two-worker case. 
The important results are that: 
1. both tournaments and piece-rate contracts are equally efficient if workers are 
homogeneous and risk-neutral 
2. tournaments dominate piece-rate if there is a significant common uncertainty on all 
workers' output and workers are risk-averse. 
These two results not only lay a very important foundation for future developments, they are 
also the first rigorous declaration of the (de)merits of tournament which is adopted in many 
real situations but ignored by many economists in the past However, their works are not-
pioneering since studies on topics related with rank-order tournaments were done by Galton 
(1901) and Akerlof (1976). Although the latter studies were not directly related with 
tournament Galton did try to set up the optimal proportion between the values of the first 
and second prizes under very restrictive assumptions like fixed population and normality of 
the distribution of merits (outputs) on competitors. Besides, Akerlof modelled a working 
condition under which speed and ability are factors of production. The equilibrium will be 
characterised as an inefficient perfect sorting equilibrium. Although workers of different … 
abilities are sorted into different assembly lines, over-investment exists in nearly all lines. In 
spite of the fact that his major objective is only to show how "indicator" (speed which is 
assumed as a signal of abilities) distorted the equilibria, it provides a setting on the behaviour 
4 
of workers under racing. 
With respect to the second claim mentioned above, Nalebujf & Stiglitz (1982), 
Holmstrdm (1982) and Green & Stokey (1983) proved more rigorously that the optimal 
» 
contract should be individualistic if there are no common uncertainties. This is because 
while one's output is compared with others', he/she only needs to face his/her own 
idiosyncratic shocks and the additional variance due to comparing with others. While in 
individualistic contract, workers have to face both his own risk as well as the common risk. 
Hence，the latter variance，if large, will be a strong advantage favourable to tournaments. 
Besides, common uncertainty, although unknown ex ante or even ex post to the firm, can be 
gradually extracted by tournaments. This is because as every worker's output is equally 
affected by the common shock, their outputs difference will be independent of the common 
shock. This information value cannot be ignored especially when number of workers is 
large^. Large number of workers is similar to large samples which are a ground for more 
accurate estimate (or sufficient statistic) in a statistical sense. Although there is an 
information loss due to using relative performance, this may be counter-balanced by the 
positive information value if the number of competitors is large. Besides, it is also proved 
that neither the set of feasible tournament nor the optimal tournament depends on the 
distribution function for the common shock. Hence, if the distribution is unknown to 
principal，then, tournament will be preferred. (Refer to the Lemma 1 of Green Stokey 
(1983)). 
‘ -A rather distinct article of Cannichael (1983) on P-A problem disproved the first 
claim mentioned above. He argued that, when principaVs effort is also a joint factor of 
Hence, the non-optimality of tournament will be more obvious due to the information 
loss on only comparing relative petfonnance if shocks are independent 
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production with workers' effort and is unohservahle to workers，tournaments will be adopted 
even when workers are risk-neutral Besides, given other things constant, piece-rate relative 
to "relative output" contract is more important the less risk averse are the workers. That is, 
f 
if workers are more risk-averse, the optimal wage contract (linear combination of both piece-
rate and relative output) should have more weight on "relative output". The results seem to 
be distinct to that before. However, since there is one principal working with many agents, 
the role of the principal was just like a common shock to all agents. When we reconsider 
the model in this way, all the results will become consistent with the second claim. This is 
because the shock faced by the principal becomes the common shock to all workers. Then， 
广， 
as mentioned before, this makes the adoption of tournament more favourable. The 
symmetry was ignored by the author. 
Another work by Malcomson (1984) is again another try to disprove the first claim. 
He showed that by comparing two firms with and without tournaments, it is always possible 
to prove that the former Pareto dominates the later. However, he put emphasis on the 
incentive effect of tournament And he was not comparing a tournament with a piece-rate 
contract but rather a flat-wage contract. Absence of incentive under a flat-wage contract is 
indeed the strongest reason on explaining the relative advantage of tournaments in his model 
Besides，a fixed standard (average performance of other workers) instead of variable 
performances of peers is used. In some tournament, a worker is comparing with variable 
"standards" (the output levels of all competitors). Hence, given other things constant，the 
variance of income will be larger than that in a piece-rate. This is one of the defect of using 
tournament Therefore, using a fixed standard will reduce the seriousness of this problem. 
Although most studies on tournament concentrate on internal labour market， 
Mookherjee (1984) provided a macro-analysis on the incentive nature of tournaments. He 
6 
further proposed that common shocks (perfect correlation among workers' outputs) are 
necessary to attain the first-best result if sujficient penalty can be imposed on shirking. These 
results are actually similar to what Holmstrom (1982) claimed. Meyer & Mookherjee (1987) 
f 
further analyzed tournaments and inequality in a social point of view. The basic 
contradiction between them is obvious. Because of the discrete distribution of the wage 
prizes and the smaller number of wage levels, then the income distribution will no longer 
reflect the different output levels of different people as in an individualistic contract. So, in 
a very simple context: n prizes, homogeneous workers and binomial distribution of the 
uncertainty, he proposed a "pseudo-toumament" contract which remedies the problem 
mentioned above, "Pseudo-toumwnent"is only a tournament with randomised contracts and 
which maintains the incentive of workers but achieves a more equal distribution of income. 
Rosen (1986) continued his early work with Lazear by concentrating on real 
tournaments. The idea of using real tournaments is adopted by some following authors 
(Ehrenherg & Boghanno (1990)). In his paper, a model of elimination tournaments (like that 
of tennis) was used. The main objective is to explain what the optimal prize structures 
should be in order to maintain a certain level of efforts. His paper will be mentioned more 
in later section when we explain the relation between hierarchy and tournaments. 
As just mentioned above, Ehrenherg & Bognanno tried to verify the incentive effect 
of real tournament prize structures on players，performance (which is represented by the score 
records). Their empirical work is different from the earlier experimental work of Clive, 
- Andrew & Keith (1987) although both provide consistent results to theories. (Further detail 
of the latter paper will be presented in chapter III). Incentive effect of tournaments was 
proved to be important Another empirical study on the relationship between experience and 
performance among managerial and professional employers doing similar work in two major 
7 
U.S. corporations was done by Medoff & Abraham (1980). In their paper, evidence of the 
strong relation between relative performance to earnings is found. That is, ranking of 
performance was quite a common and significant practice in managerial works. However, 
f 
the relation between experience and earnings is uneasy to establish. The latter result 
contradicts the standard human capital theory. 
LB.2.) 
From all the results above, there seems to be quite a lot of support on the positive 
incentive effect of tournaments. However, when we study more aspects of the area^ a few 
points of relative disadvantage can he found. 
As mentioned above, Akerlof has shown that over-investment is a source of 
inefficiency of tournaments. Similar result was obtained by Rosen (1981) and Nalebujf & 
Stigilitz (1981) who stated more clearly that the cost of perfect sorting was over-investment 
by higher ability workers. They argued that since lower ability workers always have the 
incentive to join the contest of higher ability, then the later have to invest more to avoid 
sharing the eventual wages (output) with them. To remedy this self-selection problem, 
Bhattacharya Guasch (1988) proposed that tournaments across self-selected workers 
(across-cohort) will attain a first-best efficient equilibrium and thus dominates within-cohort 
comparison as usually assumed in previous papers. The results are mainly theoretically 
proved. However, less implications are derived. First-best solution is achieved basically 
because the assumption that within-cohorts feasible efforts are only a sub-set of that of cross-
cohorts. The bigger feasible set of solution contains the first-best one. However, the ability 
types in the first-best across-cohort equilibrium are limited to a certain range. The reason 
is that if abilities are very different, then large wage compensations are needed to offer to 
8 
those heterogeneous workers in within-coliort tournaments. Because if one higher ability 
competes with another lower ability, then, a larger prize spread is to attract the high ability 
and hence deter the low ability to join the contests. Hence, in symmetric game, the prize 
spread can he smaller. Hence, large difference of ability types will only favour within-cohort 
contests. (This is Based on the presence of "limited liability constraint"^ in his original 
paper). Similar argument was given by Dye (1983). He pointed out that the opportunity 
needed to compensate workers is the discounted expected value of their own marginal 
products. Any losing wage less than this will only reduce the incentive^. 
Another problem relates to the second claim. It is proved that with the absence of 
common shock, individualistic contract dominates tournaments (Nalebuff & Stigliiz (1981)， 
Holmstrdm (1982) ,Green & Stokcy (1983)，Mookherjee (1984,1982)), Hence, the optimality 
of adopting tournament depends critically on the importance of common shock in reality. 
Most of the studies on tournament assume independent outputs among agents. 
However, when one worker's effort affects the others' output, then the optimality of 
tournaments does not hold. Holmstrdm，s’ model (1982) does not give many hints on solving 
the complexities of team work because he assumed team production is a linear combination 
of individual worker's output. The interactive influences among workers' efforts are ignored. 
So, similar results are derived. Dye (1983) observed the problem and pointed out that 
3 This "limited liability constraint" is actually a non-negative (pre-tournament) wages. 
4 There are not many detail analyses on the optimal value of loser's wage in the 
literature. What some predicted was that the pre-toumament fixed wage will adjust until the 
reservation utility constraint is fulfilled. Mathematically speaking, they ignored an "incentive-
maintaining constraint". In this thesis, this problem is solved by adding a "loser does not 
quit" constraint. 
9 
collusion among workers will destroy the optimality of tournament. Obviously, illegal 
compromise in reducing efforts in equal amount among workers will be harmful to the firm. 
Since he did not provide a rigorous model，there is obvious doubt on the sustainahility or 
f 
even existence of such collusive equilibrium. 
Another article (Drago &. Turnhull (1988)) shows a clearer analysis on team 
incentives when positive externalities among workers' efforts are assumed. They 
demonstrated the inefficiency of tournaments when there are positive externalities and when 
workers are risk-averse. When there is "complete sharing" of individual output, that is ,when 
output is equally affected by individual worker's efforts，the optimal effort will be zero since 
it is impossible to discover or punish the shirker. When there is "partial sharing"] that is, 
some team-workers' efforts are more important in determining the size of individual output, 
then they will have incentive to elicit positive effort. The greater the effect of other team 
members' effort on one's own output, the smaller the optimal effort levels elicited by the later 
because he/she has less discretion power on his/her own output Besides，since this team 
element increases the noise faced by an individual worker, optimality will not be achieved 
if workers are risk averse. This problem cannot be remedied even if the tournament is 
designed to compare across teams because the total noise of one whole team is larger^. Of 
course, if all workers are risk-neutral, the problem will not arise^. 
One fundamental assumption on the usual literature of tournament is the assumption 
of the existence of Nash equilibrium. However，existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium 
^ If members' own risks are independent, then, the total variance equals to the 
summation of all individuals' variances. 
6 The problem depends quite a lot on the implication of the noise and the production 
function . If it represents the error of measurement of the final output (e.g. project)，and if 
the output is indivisible to any agent, then there will not be any additional noise. 
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is not guaranteed when the vanance of the underlying idiosyncratic shock(o^) is small This 
is because small o^ may Imply positive marginal change of the marginal probability of 
winning, which, in turn, may outweigh the rising cost function of effort so that the (negative 
)second order condition does not hold (Rosen (1981)). Similar warning is given by Nalebuff 
Stiglitz (1981). They termed the problem a "nonconvexity" problem and provided an 
intuitive explanation of it. If o^ is too small, the marginal probability will be very high. It 
is not worth the worker to elicit any effort. Contrarily, there is another possible equilibrium: 
Stackleherg equilibrium, in which workers' optimal strategy is to pay zero effort. This is 
because, given information on opponents' abilities，they may believe that they will have 
lower probability to win when facing a strong counterpart who in turn will believe in the 
same way and not take the trouble to elicit any effort (Dye (1983)). So, no worker will pay 
positive effort finally. 
LB3.) 
The above is only a summary of the main pros and cons of tournaments as an 
incentive scheme. Some other reasons may also show us why organizations prefer to use 
tournaments than others. When there are high monitoring or measuring costs of workers' 
efforts, ordinal performance will be less costly to obtain than individual performance (Green 
Stokey (1983)). In reality, the performances of supervisee are usually ranked as good, fair 
or bad in some evaluation made by supervisors. Quantitative evaluation is difficult or may 
even be inaccurate. Besides, subjective feeling on individual performance is sometimes 
dependent on comparison among candidates. This may not reflect the value judgement or 
even prejudice of the supervisors. However, it only indicates how costly it is for him to 
quantify the performance of each candidate. 
11 
Another possible reason for adopting tournaments may be due to indivisible rewards. 
Agents may need to compete for one prize and hence the only information needed is who 
is the best performer. 
f 
Similar to many other studies on optimal incentive device (Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) 
and Viscusi (1986)) , rising wage contract is proved to he optimal This result is consistent 
with the empirical data and also what tournament theory implies. Note that, tournament 
theory not only provides hint on rising schedule of wages but also the variance of wages 
within a firm even at the same level of organization. It also shows what the optimal spread 
is between or within levels of organization. Furthermore, the theory is applicable to many 
situations where relative performance among candidates is used. Owing to the idea of using 
tournaments within firms, it is logical to relate the effect of tournaments on optimal 
hierarchical structures and promotion schemes. The followings are summaries of these 
ideas^. 
I.e.) Tournament and hierarchy and promotion 
Theories on optimal hierarchical structures and promotion schemes are derived in 
many different contexts. Tournament theory is one of them. In the tournament model, the 
hierarchical structure is proved to be pyramidal, that is, there are a larger number of workers 
Shapiro & Stiglitz studied how the equilibrium unemployment rate may be an effective 
worker discipline device. And Viscusi proved that since a complete insurance will provide 
no incentive for workers to do better, wage differentials across periods are needed to reduce 
their incentive to shirk. Besides, wages contingent on workers，previous performance are 
needed. Risk insurance is provided across different states of nature in each period. 
o 
Note that, although there are no explicit and systematic analysis on this area，I guess 
it is quite an interesting subsequent topic. 
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receiving a lower wage than those receiving a higher wage. The explanation is different from 
that of Simon (1957) who assumed that the pyramidality is due to a technological 
consideration. In which, limited span of control for each supervisor is a given "production" 
structure. Besides, he also does not use the idea of evaluation cost or information cost which 
is the idea adopted by Sah and Stiglitz. Sah and Stiglitz (1988) compared three different 
decision mechanisms: committees, centralized and decentralized organizations. Three main 
problems: information cost, human error and organization error, characterize the nature of 
different organizations. They proved that the optimal number of levels is inversely related 
to the quality of portfolio and evaluation cost The higher the evaluation cost, the smaller 
the number of levels of hierarchy. And hierarchy, as they defined, is an organization 
adopting the centralized decision method. The reverse is true for polyarchy or decentralized 
decision method. So, evaluation cost is a factor determining the form of organizations. 
Another consideration is the incentive inducement provided in the contract. Even if the wage 
levels are optimally chosen, if the number of promoted is larger than that of candidates, there 
will be no incentive for the workers to do better. Cooter and Restrepo (1979) made a 
similar assumption on the optimal sizes of the two levels in a hierarchy. Hence, generally 
speaking，there will be an optimal relation between wages and hierarchy size. More explicit 
result is derived by Malcomson (1984). He even proved that the optimal hierarchical 
structures should be when the probability of promotion for workers is less than half. 
Although Rosen's study (1986) already assumed a given tournament structure: a 
sequential knock-out tournament with two contestants competing with each other in a round 
as that in tennis tournaments, the equilibrium prize structure derived possesses certain 
characteristics applicable to reality. The characteristics include a marked wage difference 
in the last (highest) level of an organization and an equal spread between middle levels. 
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This, of course, cannot be explained by a large rise in marginal productivity in the last 
period. He provided an incentive reason: to maintain contestants，incentive to proceed 
through every stage of the tournament，and to avoid the negative effect of "no more 
i 
tomorrow，'，firms have to provide a large prize difference to attract them. This prize 
difference will "make the game appear of infinite length to a contestant, as if there are 
always many steps left to attain, no matter how far one has climbed in the past. “ (pp.702) 
This idea is actually derived from a mathematical operation converting the prize difference 
into a perpetuity 义 However, it is difficult to be a real fact of thinking in contestants' mind. 
No matter how, the equilibrium wage profile corresponding to this "arithematic"^^ 
hierarchical structure is convex rather than concave over time as implied by rdany other 
traditional theories. 
If abler workers will produce positive externalities (supervision) to the less able, then, 
tournaments can be an effective sorting instruments to place different ability workers into 
different hierarchies. The value of matching the right person to the right position will induce 
workers to self-select themselves into their own league. Because a low ability worker will find 
that his relative outputs will be smaller when he is to compete with a high ability worker. 
This is because the lower ability workers' expected utility in their own league, now, exceeds 
that across leagues. The probability for him to be promoted to a higher position (although 
this is a wrong match) is larger than that when competing with other abler ones. This 
deviates from Lazear and Rosen's (1981) model because the latter assumes away the value 
of on-]'ob-matching (Bhattacharya S： Guasch (1988)). 
9 Actually, as what he said, the prize spread is just similar to an option whose value is 
realised when owners exercise it, 
I tenn it "arithmetic" because the members of contestants in each sequential stage 
is just half of the former. 
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There is another study (Calvo and Wellisz (1979)) on the characteristics of 
equilibrium hierarchy. One finding is that the wage difference is larger than the ability (real 
productivity) difference over the hierarchy. A higher wage difference is needed to induce 
supervisors (or senior workers) to work better since their shirking will affect the production 
of the whole team. This is similar to the team effect mentioned in section LB.2. Similar 
assumption on the roles of supervisors is found in Stiglitz (1975). In a simple tournament 
setting, the equilibrium wage difference is W^-Wj = V/gie^^-e^) where Vis the product prize 
and gi^yf^^) is the equilibrium marginal probability of winning given the optimal effort 
difference e^-e^. An increase in ability difference, which can also be represented by 
equilibrium e^-e^, will reduce the value of gie^-Cg) and hence increase the equilibrium W2-
Wj. Generally speaking, we can find an inverse relation between ability difference and wage 
difference as Calvo and Wellisz stated. 
There are some other studies on promotion and hierarchical structures in internal 
labour markets (Oswald (1984), Mirrlees (1974) Banerjee and Beggs (1989)). Since all of 
the above will enrich the results but is not related much to our current objective, I will not 
discuss them in detail 
In the following section, as a supplement of the relevant area of my thesis. I would 
like to mention some literature about finn-specific elements in determining wage profiles 
and/or promotion scheme. Firm-specific elements include specific him an capital, finn-
specific information and firm-specific seniority because all the above possess similar 
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characteristics to our main concern: specific human capital theory^. Pure review on only 
specific human capital may not add too much additional ideas and interest to my thesis. 
I.D.) Tournament and finn-specificities 
In nearly all studies，finn-specificities cause a rising wage profile. However, different 
implications on the relation between wages and marginal products of workers are concluded. 
Because of the difficulty of quantifying the marginal products of workers, it seems to be a 
never verifiable problem. 
Although those finn -specificities are in some ways similar to the standard specific 
human capital models, some of them imply contradictory results. Ohashi (1983) took 
workers' expectation on layoff policies of firms and imperfect capital market into account. 
Hence, the resulting wage profile will he consistent with the consumption profile of workers. 
Lciyoff will be reduced because this will be anticipated by workers and workers will in turn 
demand for a higher the first period's wage compensation. Cannichael (1983 and 1985) 
added information of worker's satisfaction and firms，gradual acquisition of workers' 
productivities which are known only after employment 
Seniority is another explanation of promotion. This promotion scheme was proved 
to be efficient by Cannichael (1983). And wages and employment equilibrium under firm-
specific seniority was derived (loannides & Pissarides (1983)). Last but not all, the 
possibility of quitting is one major and sound reason to explain rising wage profile 
(Donaldson & Eaton (1976) and Barron & Loewenstein (1985)). 
However it is noteworthy to mention that seniority and objective to reduce labour 
11 For simplicity, I denote all the above as "finn-specificities" 
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turnover are basically due to the firm-specific human capital embodied in the workers. It 
is not seniority itself that is productive to firms. Because of this, long-term relation between 
firms and workers are in the mutual interest for both parties. Also because of this，the 
coexistence of tournament wage contract and firm-specificities will he an interesting topic to 
study because tournaments reduce the incentive of workers to stay and this in turn is a loss 




Tournament and Specific Human Capital 
ILA, 
f 
In this chapter，a firm with tournament is compared with one without tournament The 
model is based on the idea of Malcomson (1984), In his paper，a model in a two-period 
context is derived. As mentioned in the literature review in Chapter I，he proved that a 
tournament contract is Pareto optimal to a flat wage ocntract. Here，I will try to model the 
problem more rigourously. The emphasis is not to compare the efficiency of different contracts, 
but rather to consider why the firm should retain workers after tournament^ Besides^ in this 
chapter, under very simple context, different wage profiles are found equally optimal This will 
be father analyzed in section I LA. 4. 
ILA.l. Basic Assumptions 
1. It is a two-period model with promotion occuring at the end of the first period. 
2. Firms are risk-neutral and they maximize expected profit 
3. Workers are risk-neutral and they maximize expected income. Workers are heterogeneous 
in ability. And we let A represents the higher ability worker and B represents the other. 
4. For firm I, the payment schedule is that 
- in the first period, all workers are paid the same wage, Wq 
� I t is undeniably more realistic to compare tournament and piece-rate contract However^ 
since many authors (for instants，Lazear & Rosen (1981), Green & Stokey (1983)) had already 
make intensive comparison on the problem and the emphasis of this thesis is not on the relative 
efficiency of both contracts, I will ignore this idea. 
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- after promotion, the winner is paid W2, while the loser is paid Wj 
5. For finn II，the payment schedule is that, 
- all workers are paid Wq & Wj in periods 1 & 2 correspondingly 
f 
6. e, is the minimum observable effort level And effort levels greater than e are not directly 
observable. Workers are assumed to put in e in the second period in both firm. 
7. Sp is the multiplicative time factor which indicates the specific training enbodied in 
worker i in the first period. S^ > S^ because A is more able than B. The values of S^ 
Sl Sb cire exogeneously given here (although they can he choice variables for workers as 
assumed in usual human capital model). Any non-firm-specific human capital is 
assumed to be non-productive here. 
8. The production function is 
^ = + M/ ……(2J) 
where ju, & e- are in dependent and 
E(y^i) = 0 
= a 2 
E(iii^j) = 0 for i 
That is, output is linearly dependent on effort level and an additive idiosyncratic shock. 
Assume that there is no multi-agent problem or co-workers problem and output is 
directly observable to the finn. 
9. Then，probability of promoting A is : 
prob( q^ > Qb) = prob(e^ + /i^ > + � 
=proh(e^ - ^B ^ ^B- ^a) 
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=^(^A - ^B) 
where g(iig - is the p.d.f, of (fi^ - /i^J with distribution (0,2o^) 
Hence, probability of promoting B is, 
f 
prob(q^>qJ = l-G(e^-e^) 
=probability of not promoting A 
10. The best alternative wage for both workers in both periods is assumed equal to W^, the 
reservation wage. And workers provide e in the alternative firm. 
For convenience, in the following analysis, let's denote all variables of the firm 
with tournament by superscript T & "11" to the one without tournament 
11.A.2. Model 
The problem faced by firm I is : 
Max, E r r ^ = e j + + (Sj + Sb)召-W/-W/ •....(2.2) 
{^ih � ^ B 
EU/ = W/ + G^W/ + (J-Gl)W/-CJe/)-CJe-) > 2W^-2CJe)..…(2.3) 
> ..…(2.4) 
e j e argmca EUj ……(2.5) 
e j e argmax EU^ ……(2.6) 
^ K： ……口.7) 
where inequality (2,7) is the no-quitting constraint which will be relaxed later for further 
analysis. This constraint guarantees losing worker will stay in the firm in the second periods 
Similarly, the problem faced by firm II is : 
- ^ • — 、 … — 〜 〜 一 
香 港 中 文 X ；v.f . . 小 . ； L. 人 入 卞 H ^ ^ 灼 减 書 
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Max = + •.…(2.8) 
s.t ]V/l-2CJeJl) > 2W„^-2CJe)..…(2.9) 
t 
EUj/l=阶/+ > 2Wm-2CB(e-)..…(2J0) 
e / e argtnax EU/ ...... (2.11) 
e^^ € argtnax EU/ (2.12) 
� ! ……(2,13) 
It is easy to find that ej^ - ej! - e hy (2.11) & (2.12) and hence, we can rewrite the 
- 广, 
objective function as 
f：?/^ 二 + (Sj + SB)e--2JVj" …..(2.8)' 
and ignore (2,11) & (2.12) in following analysis. 
I LA. 3. Equilihrium 
Since optimal levels of effort are derived from maximising EU，we replace the 
corresponding optimality condition of (2.5) and (2.6) by their F.O.C?: 
i i W ^ W j ) 二 ……（25)， 
iiW^-Wj) = Cb， ……(2.6)， 
where ^ is the first derivative of G^. 
The corresponding S.O.C will be: /，(W/-IV/) -Cy < 0 and 
2 This method is used hy various writers before, such as Ross(1973) and Spence & 
Zeckhauser (1971), 
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The Lagrangian function of firm I is : 
^Wl-C^ ( e / ) -2 � ) 
-Ca) -C'b�^^'{vjI-WJ 
……(2.13) 
where x j , y j , y^ e , are the Lagrangian multipliers of the respective 
constraints. 
By (2.5)，(2.6)： assuming C/< Cy; hence e j > e/ and eJ^eJV/j^Wj^) and 
Cq = e^ (W2' W2 ), that is, equilibrium e! depends on W^-Wj, i=A,B. 
The corresponding RO.C. of Lagrangian function (2.13) are, by using pointwise 
optimization : 
W/: -2 + + 义/ 二 {？ ……(2.14) 
W/： e j + e^/ -I + / a / - 功 - / ( r / + r / ) + = 0 ……(2.15) 
3 Since si^A'^g) “ P.d.f. function and ^'(e^^-Cg) may be positive, the negativity of 
S,O.C. may not be necessary true. At very low level of effort difference, may be positive or 
even exceed the marginal cost of efforts. This existence problem of equilibrium was alredy 
pointed out by Lazear & Rosen (1981) and mentioned in section LB.2 of Chapter L Of course, 
it is undeniably a doubt on the equilibrium. 
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"^/： + -1 + 义/ - V； + gW + YB') = 0 ……(216) 
where e-f is the partial derivative w.r.t. Wp j = l，2. 
eAi： 7 - - WjJ - W^J + V - W/)) + r / � + y/(/W2'. =0 
…"〔 2 7 7 ) , 
e/: 1 - 2Wo/ - W � / - W^/ + 义/ (-/(W/ - W/)) + Y b � - YaVOV/ - W/) = 0 
……(2.18) 
义 W j + gI(W/ - W/) + W/ - CJe/) - CJe) = - 2CJe) ……(2.19) 
义/••炉/ - - W/) + W/ - C^re/； - CB(e-) = - 2C^(e) ……(2.20) 
n / . /OV/ _ 恢/) = Cy ……(2-21) 
r / /(JV/ - JV/) = Cb， ……(222) ^ 
qI: W/ = W^^ ……（2.23J 
where a^ & a^ are the S.O.C. of (2.5)' & (2.6)' and negativity are assumed held; and 
Wji are the partial derivative of Wj w.r.t. e!，which are derived from ef = 
J J T T 
Since e^j = -e^p and e^j = is easy to be observed from (2.5)，& (2.6)'), 
then, (2.15) plus (2.16) will be : 
-2 + e/ = 0 
e , 二 2 � {？ ……(2.24) 
Since e/(W�I - WJ > 0，by Kuhn-Tucker condition, e' > 0, implies W/ = W^ ..…(2.25) 
That is, firm I will offer a loser wage equal to W^^^ and hence losing worker will not quit 
in second period. 
Using (2.25) and (15)' or (16)： 
2J 




By (2.14)，A^^ + A^^=2, However，whether X^ or Xq > 0 is uncertain. Which EU 
constraint is binding depends on, in equilibrium, which EU is smaller in value. This is known 
only when we substitute equilibrium value of efforts into the EU equations (2.19) and (2,20). 
Since all we know are the higher marginal cost of effort of B and lower equilibrium level of 
effort B, then, it is uncertain that which constraint will be binding. Nevertheless, we are certain 
that one of them will he binding and Wq will be determined as 
if X j > 0, X^ - 0 and vice versa if X j = 0 and X^ > 0. 
Since W/ = W,” and the sign of Xj^ is uncertain, for simplicity, we take X^ > 0 and X^ = 
0，then, 
……（227) 
Hence, Wq < W^^^ or Wq > W^^^ depends on the actual size of cost &. expected benefit 
The equilibrium signs or sizes of y j , Yb can be found by solving (2.14)，(2J5), (116)’ 
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(2.17) (2.18) simultaneously. Again, assuming Xj,义/ > 0 .Then, rewriting (2.16) into, 
f 
……(2.i6y 
The R.H.S, equals to a constant. Therefore, as argued in Borch (1967), a perfect risk-
sharing equilibrium is resulted. Hence，no change in wages can improve the expected profit of 
the finn. This implies that the L.H.S. of the above equation equal to zero*. 
Similiarly, in the problem of finn II, the Lagmngian function is: 
……(2.28) 
However, since，the equilibrium expected utility of B will be smaller than that of A, therefore， 
only EUq is binding and we ignore the expected utility constraint of A. And the Lagmngian 
function will become: 
(5^+55) e-2Wl^) + 入 / 工 （ 队 工 工 工 工 - ) 
4 The derivation of equilibrium of y j , y^^ will be shown in the appendix 1. 
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Hence, the F. O. C. are, 
WQ": -2 + X / + i / = 0 ……（2.29) 
W/i: -2 + Jijl + 义 / + e " 二 0 ...... (130) 
义/.• Wo" + W/ - � = - 2CB(e-) ……(2.31) ’ 
QII: W/I = 
From (129) & (130), we find that Q" = 0, then W严 > W^ and we take it as 
equality^. 
jT jr 
Again, since the two participation constraints are the same, then X^ = Xq = 1 > d 
Hence + W/^ = and the assumption W/I = W,，】 gives us W^j^ = W^too. That 
is, under this non-tournament model with exogeneous specific human capital，the equilibrium 
wage structure is flat and equal to the reservation wage. 
Hence, the equilibrium wage profiles of the two firms above will he: 
一 / U . - w / . w J . " 
‘ � 
1 1 y UVoL 
0 I 2/ 
(figure 1) 
5 This simplification is considered logical 
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where value of Wq depends . 
Proposition 1 
Tournament contract is Pareto optimal to flat wage structures when the worker's 
f 
marginal cost of eliciting effort is low, holding other things constant. 
Proof: 
Since expected utility level is guaranteed in both finns, we are to find out which firm has 
higher equilibrium expected profit Then, 
En 工-En 工 工 - 2司-
= 石 - 2 ( C , ( e / ) ) -（1 -2G工�(JV^^-WJ 
广， 
> 0 or < 0 depending on the magnitude of - C^(e) at equilibrium. 
If cost curves rise slowly, then - C^(e) will be small, and (1-2G^) will be larger 
in absolute value since the effect of increasing e^ is larger, hence, En^ > En^^ is more likely. 
Intuitively, this is because, given other things constant，the lower the cost of effort，the lesser the 
equilibrium wage compensation to be paid. Besides, the lower the cost of effort, the higher the 
equilibrium effort level and hence then output level The latter effect will then be more likely 
to dominate the former. 
ILA A, 
In the following pages, we are going to consider a relevant problem : when does the firm 
keep the losing workers? The reason basically depends on the presence of specific human 
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capital For simplicity, in the following analysis, the superscripts T or "11" used before will be 
ignored here. 
f 
By the same method, without the no-quitting constraint, a tournament firm in equilihrium 
will offer : 
.....(2.32) 
and W2-Wj = C^VS 
Since efforts rise with wage differential, JV�-W】，a firm reducing both W2 <Sc Wj by the 
same amount will not change the optimal effort levels. However, as shown in (2.32), reducing 
Wj will just increase Wq by the same amount in equilibrium. Let the reduction of wages be m. 
And the second period expected level of output will he equal to G(S^e) + (l'G)S^e because 
the loser will leave the firm in second period for Wj< W^. And (Wj-m) will be zero since it 
will not be paid. Then, the new level of En will be : 
= {GS^+{1-G) S^) e-2 {Wq+w) -(N^-w) - {W^-m) 
=^A^^B^ ( (1 -⑵ e-2W^- VI: -m 
= {G(S^-Sq) 
… … ( 2 J 3 ) 
> or < than (e^ + <？石 + (^a + ^B^^ ‘ -^o ‘ ‘ ^i) depending on whether G ( S a � � 
S^e > or < than - Wj + m 
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or S^e - G(S^ - 3^)6 < or > than Wj-m = W � - m ……(2.34) 
or (I-G)SJ + GS^e < or > than 川 - m ……(2.34)， 
’ 
that is, on the relative size of expected second period output loss and the new loser wage. 
If the former is smaller than the new lower loser wage, then, wage reduction will be more 
profitable^ and vice versa. 
By (2.34)] we find that, given values of S^, S^ , e and it is always possible to find 
a wage reduction m such that 
(l'G)S^e + GS^e < PF爪-m ……(2.34)；, 
except when (l-G)S^e + GS^e > PF爪. 
If (2.34)" holds, assuming Wq is at a value higher than W^^, the wage profiles will be 




* 一 — 一 — — — - - vy\ 
0 • z , 
(figure 2) 
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In this new profile, the incremental wage across periods time will he smaller, however, 
the wage difference within period will be the same. And it will be Pareto optimal for the firm 
to reduce its wage payments as in this case when the expected output loss is small enough� 
， 
It is interesting to note that, if the firm increases rather than decreases the wages and 
keeping the wage differential constant, then new En will be : 
= (5^+5^) e-2 (Wq-hi) - (W^ +m) - (W^+m) 
= E T Z {original) 
-
Hence, the firm will be indifferent as to whether to scale up the wage profile. Here, the 
new profile will be steeper. That is, there is a greater incremental across time and constant wage 
differential within period. This helps to explain the phenomenon of coexistence of different wage 
schedules of competitive firms in the same market. 
Although part of the result above is empirically not sound, it raises a missing area which 
previous writers have ignored. However, the case mentioned above allow a smaller number of 
workers retained in the second period in the firm, hence, it ignores the possihity that an optimal 
labour size is required in both periods. Therefore, in the next section, I will try to further 
introduce a variable, optimal labour size，to explain why does the firm keep the losing workers. 
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ILA.5. Tournament and optimal labor size 
Firms adopting tournament system will face a possibility that losing workers may quit 
after tournament, incurring a cost to the firm. Here I try to consider briefly a rehiring cost 
f 
which happens when worker size, at any moment of time，deviates from the "optimal" one 
which is endogenised in the system and chosen by the firm before hiring any worker, 
AgaiUj there are several possible attractions explaining why losing workers may quit 
Here，I summarize the factors into his best alternative offer outside the tournament firms. 
Explicitly，whenever the losers' wage is lower than the alternative, he will quit for sure. 
Since there is a trade-off between paying a lower loser's wage and letting him go and 
the "hiring cost" of rehiring new workers to maintain the optimal labor size, the firm has to 
balance between the benefit and cost. Hence，it may be profitable for the firm to maintain 
losers even if it has to offer a higher loser wage. This is because when the hiring cost is so 
large that if exceeds the wage saving arising from allowing losing workers to quit, maintaining 
the workers will be profit-maximising. So, the results depends critically on the size of the 
hiring cost. 
ILB, 
In the previous sections，an exogenous human capital is assumed. A more realistic 
situation will be when human capital is treated as a choice variable. Hence, in this section， 
the assumption 7 in section ILAJ will be relaxed. The problem will be more complicated. 
In human capital model, human capital investment by workers reduces current output 
Hence, in a two-period model, if the probability of promotion depends on the rank-order of 
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outputs, then there will be great disincentive for workers to invest. As a result, specific 
human capital (SHC) investment and tournament will coexist within a firm on]^ in long-term 
relationship and/or when tournaments are carried out at an optimal time. Long-term 
relationship is the necessaij condition for workers to invest when there is tournament. And, 
the primal objective of SHC investment to workers is not to capture the future return but 
only to win the tournament. Then，wages no longer have a direct relation with the stock but 
the relative size of human capital This will eventually lead to a human capital 
accumulation profile different from the standard HC model. With regard to the special 
nature of SHC investment, firms then choose an optimal time to carry out tournaments in 
order to maximize the total expected profit over time. 
As usually assumed in general tournament model, tournament is treated as an 
incentive device. However, in the following pages, I try to focus on investment behaviour of 
workers under tournament regardless of the incentive aspect. This is to put emphasis on the 
relation between SHC investment behaviour and tournament I will also develop two one-
toumament multi-period models in section II.B.l. In which, a model of early-toumament 
is used to compare with a late-toumament one so as to see when will it be profitable to defer 
tournament to upper hierarchy or later periods. 
II.B.L Early-toumament 
1. Basic Assumptions 
1. It is a 4'penod model One tournament is situated at the end of second period. As 
we mentioned before, in a two-period model, workers have no incentive to invest 
when tournament is carried out after the first period. Besides, three periods are not 
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enough for us to cany out comparison between early-and late-toumaments. Hence, 
the minimum number of periods needed is four. 
2. A fixed payment, is paid in the first two periods for all workers. W2 and Wj will 
， 
be paid to the winner and the loser in the third period with W] > Wj. Lastly, W^ will 
be paid in period 4 to all workers. (Although assumption that workers will also be 
paid W2 and Wj in last period is more realistic, under this simple context, there is no 
extra meaning by adding this assumption,) 
3. It is a two-worker case, namely A and B, And heterogeneity of ability is assumed. 
Let's denote A as the more able one. 
‘ . • 
4. The observable output function is : " 
k=2 
i = A，B;j=l，2，3》4 
…..(135) 
Where a,- is the fraction of time used in investment in period j for worker i and 
0 < aj < 1. Total time per period available to workers is normalized to one, which 
is allocated either to working or training only. 
OL reduces current output but increases future output through the HC 
production function F-. Concavity of F is assumed, that is, the first and second 
derivatives with respect to a fulfils F-' > 0, F-" < 0 for all I m- is the ability 
coefficient unknown to firm reflecting workers' different abilities. Lastly, /i^ denotes 
the stochastic element which is invariant with time. This tenn can also represent the 
randomness of worker's ability and/or the uncertainty exogenously imposed on the 
outputs. 
5. The probability of promotion for worker A is : 
G^probiqJ > q^) ..…(2.36) , 
with a p.cLf. since fi�(0，g2)，and assume that all stock of human capital 
accumulated previous to the firm considered non-productive. And j=2 because 
tournament is carried out at the end of second period and the probability of winning 
depends on the relative size of realized outputs. Therefore, 
O =prob(qJ > q^^) 
= > (IW)Fb(^B)^^A) 
Hence, the probability of promotion of B is 1-G. 
6. Depreciation of human capital and discount rate are ignored here. This simplification 
will not reduce our interpretation of the results. 
7. Assume that the best alternative wage offered to the worker at any moment in time 
is only the fixed minimum reservation wage, W^，which is the same to both workers. 
For convenience, let's denote all the equilibrium variables in this model by a 
superscript "E". 
2) Model 
The firm is to choose W^, JV2, Wj and Wj to maximize expected profit: 
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En= [ ( 1 - a i ) + (1-cc!) F^(al) + (1 -a l ) ] m^ 
+ [ ( l - c 4 ) +(l-al) F^ial) + ( l - a | ) F^(al+al) + ( l - O ] m^ 
f 
…”(2.37) 
subject to : 
EU^ =2Wg+G(W2-Wj) + + > ..…(2.38) 
EUs=2WO+(1-G)(W2-WJ) + WJ + W^ > ..…〔239) 
olJ e argmca EU^ ……(2.40) 
subject to 
a} > 0 ••".(2.42) 
a/ < 1 •"..(2.42.1) 
i= A，B，j= 1，2，3，4 . 
( X � e argmca EU^ (2.41) 
subject to (2.42) and (2.42.1) 
Where equation (142) and (2.42.1) are added to guarantee workers will choose an 
investment level within the feasible range. By similar method as before, we replace (2.40) and 
(2.41) by the respective F.O.C.. The F.O.C. are shown in appendix 2 
The equilibrium values of aj depends on the values of W2-W2, which is not solved 
out yet in this stage. However, given the pre-condition of positive wage gap, W2-W2 > 0，the 
only possible solution are: a^ = 0 = a^ and =1. For a proof please refer to 
appendix 3, 
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Besides，since a^ and a^ do not affect EU，there can be infinite solution of a^, 
a^ and a^^, a^"^ ranging from zero to 1. Hence, for simplicity, let's assume workers will 
choose zero investment in the third and fourth periods. This is a logical presumption 
because if there is non-zero cost of investment which is ignored here，optimal investment of 
a f , a^ should he zero. 
By the above analysis, the equilibrium investment profile (Fp) will be: 
r xr ( r ^ ) 
个 L 。 
"T 
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figure 3 
Ft jumps once in early-periods and be stable in future periods. In fact, this reflects 
how investment profile is affected when tournament is carried out in different periods. (This 
argument will he discussed in later section when we introduce late-toumament) 
Here，investment behaviour, in equilibrium, is independent of ability. It is clear that， 
from (2.40.1) and (2.41.1), both workers choose 1 in first period for all F^ \ m^ and m^ 
However，note that F^ is steeper for abler worker if ability enhances investment efficiency. 
The structures of profiles are the same to both workers. 
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Since m^ > m 万，then equilibrium probability of promotion of A will be: 
GE = G五(尸乂⑴m] - FB(l))mB > 1/2 •.…(2.43) 
favouring the abler workers. The actual size of G^ of course depends on how able is the 
worker in transforming stock of investment into output 
Under the current model, abler workers are over-compensated. G > 1/2 implies this 
result. Of course，if workers are homogeneous, equilihrium G will be equal to 1/2 and then 
all workers will obtain the reservation utility, 
Proposition 2 
There is always a positive incentive for investment when there is toumamentif there 
is a long-term relationship between workers and firm. 
Proof: 
A long-term relationship can be shown to be the necessary condition for 
positive equilibrium investment When we conceptually restrict the model to two or 
three periods, we will find that oc 产=0. This is because any positive a? will reduce G 
in the tournament that just follows. Hence, too short a relation will only eliminate 
investment not because there is no time for investors to capture the return but 
because of the discouraging nature of tournament against any contemporary reduction 
of output Under the current context, any investment which occurs just before 
tournament will be zero. 
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In this simple context, there is no unique relation between the optimal levels of a and 
the wage gap, W2-Wj, This is basically due to the absence of the cost of investment home 
by workers. However, adding this assumption will not add much new findings relevant to 
my objectives. 
The optimal Wj is obtained by solving the respective Lagrangian function气 By the 
F.O.C.J we find that EU^ is binding in equilibrium. Then 
+ .….(149) 
五一 • 们 - G 财 [ 时 
2 1 - G ^ 
…" ( 2 . 4 9 y 
However, W f , PF/, Wf and W/ are 
not directly determined by the F,O.CL All we can 
find here is the relationship between wages. 
If we impose constraints that workers will receive expected utilities not less than their 
best alternatives in each period�then，the equilibria will be much clearer. The idea behind 
is that firms will not be willing to incur a loss by letting skilled workers leave. Hence，it will 
be logical to offer the minimum expected utility which is just enough to maintain the 
workers. And we assume that workers will leave whenever the future expected utility is below 
their best alternative (s). As implied before, because A has a higher probability of obtaining 
the winner wage, W^ the EU^ is larger than or equal to EU^ at each period. Hence，we only 
6 Please refer to appendix 4. 
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need to consider the expected utility of B in each period since only EU^ in each period is 
binding. 
The EU^^ at the beginning of different periods are : 
EU/(period 1) 二 4Wm , 
EU^iperiod 2) = - W/ …..(2.50) 
EUbE(period 3) = PT / + IRK/ or Wf + W/ …••(2.51) 
EU/^(period 4) = W/ ..…�252) 
The equilibrium wages will be made more clear here. In (2.52), W^-Wj^ because W^^ is 
his best alternative. In (2.51)，since W/ > Wf，then Wf 二 W爪 < PF^E. This is tecause 
the best alternative of obtaining EU(period 3) is Since the best alternative of 
obtaining EU (period 2) is then W^ will be less than W爪 because，substituting the 
results above and if W^ = W^ then, (2.49) will be violated. Hence，under this situation，the 
only feasible wage profile will be: 
W/ < W/ = Wf = W^< •.…(2.53) 
So，all workers will he over-compensated in period 2. That is, EU^(period 2) 




In the next section，a late-tournament model is derived for comparison. 
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I LB. 2. Late-tournament 
1. Basic assumptions 
In addition to the assumptions 1, 3, 4，6, 7 shown in section (II.B.I), assumption 2 
， 
and 5 are modified as: 
2，) A fixed payment Wg is paid in the first three periods for all workers. Tournament is 
carried out at the end of the third period. W2 and Wj will he wages paid to the 
winner and the loser with W2 > Wj. 
5，) The probability of promotion for worker A is : 
G ^prob( q j > q^^ ) 
二 G((厂a力FJa乂+ a力m] - + ) 
Let's denote all the relevant equilibrium variables in the current model by a 
superscript "L". By similar method, the equilibrium a will be: Q：乂几=0^丛二以B让二况二人 
And a^JL 二 a召乙二 (9. The explicit model and derivation of equilibria will be shown in 
appendix 5. 
Actually，the solution is similar as that before. The equilibrium investment profile 
(F^^) is also shown in figure 1. Where the four periods' investment levels are 0，0，F(2) and 
F(2) respectively. 
Proposition 3 
Under one-toumament SHC model, if the tournament is carried out in later periods, 
then the investment profile will rise slower in early periods and faster in later periods 
than that of early-toumament. 
40 
Proof: 
This can generally be observed in figure 1 that there are more steps in F^ 
representing the investment in the first two periods. Hence, firms with late-
t 
tournaments will have a less concave investment profile and vice versa. 
The equilibrium probability of promotion of A will be : 
GL = GL(FJ2)mA-FB(2)mB) > since Fi(2) > • 
…“(2.59) 
That is，if the uncertainties across time are independent and belong to the same distribution, 
then the equilibrium probability of promotion will be larger as tournament is delayed over 
time. (gL > gE). The proof is already shown in (2.59). However, if ^^ changes with time， 
that is，it becomes /X/沪 t=l •"论，then equilibrium probabilities of promotion at the end of the 
periods, N and R, that the tournament is held will be : 
GN(FJN-l)mA-FB(N-l)mB | ‘ 
P^(FJ(R-2)l)m^-FB((R-2)l)mB 丨 a;?，2a及勺 ......^2,60) 
Where P^ is the corresponding probability given distribution of ^t�(apa?)， 
Uncertainty of relative size of the probabilities of promotion is possible even N > Ris given. 
This is because a^ ^ clr and o^ ^ Oj^ is possible. 
Similarly，as we solve for the optimal wage levels，the F.O.C implies thatEU^ is also 
binding in equilibrium^. Then’ 
夏 / + (1-G^) + W�L =4W爪 ..."(162) 
or 
7 Refer to appendix 6. 
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2 一 1-GL 
f 
…"(2.62)， 
Here，agaijy the equilibrium wage levels are unclear. 
By similar reasoning as before. If the expected utility constraints in each period are 
binding, then the various 
EUbL will be : 
EUbL (period 1) = 
EUbL(period 2) = -时 •.… 
EUbL(period 3) = ..…(2.64� ” 
EUbL(period 4) = or 炉 / ••…(2.65) 
In (2.65)，since WJL > W,，then, Wj^ = because the best alternative EU is 
Again，W/^ < W^ because Wj^ = W^ and P F / > Wj^ will violate equation f2d2)� 
Hence, the equilibrium profile will be: Wj^ < = < W/^ ..…(2.66) 
Similarly，the expected utilities in both periods 2 and 3 will be higher than the best 
alternatives. That is, EU^j^ipenod 2) = 4 炉 爪 > and EU^(penod 3) = 
2Wq^ > Besides, the winner will also be over-compensated in period 4. Substituting 
the result into (2.62)，, W^ becomes: 
‘ l-G乙 
…..(2.62)" 
I LB. 3, Comparison between early- and late-toumament models 
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To recapitulate some comparison made before, a little summary on the points 
mentioned above may be necessary. 
1. In both models, if optimal a is positive, the optimal size of a is independent of the 
timing of tournament. 
2. The optimal investment profile is less concave as the tournament is delayed. 
3. Under certain condition, equilibrium G is larger as tournament is delayed. 
Besides these three points，there are: 
4. Workers A have higher expected utility in both models. The fact that they have greater 
compensation is because they have a higher probability of promotion in both models. 
Their expected utilities will be: " 
+ 五 (W/ -W�E) + Wf +W/ 
=4Wm-(l-2GE)(W/-Wf) > = EU/ 
EUj^=3WfJ- + + WjL 
It is clear that the EU of A will be equal to 4W爪 if they are competing with 
workers of the same type because Besides, the relative size ofEU^ in 
both firms is indeterminate unless the sizes of wage gaps are known. 
5. In both firms，in equilibrium，there will be no incentive for workers to quit in any 
period. This is already shown in equations (2,50) to (2.52) and (2.63) to (2.65). In 
any period, workers B obtained expected utility not less than their best alternatives. 
Of course, workers A will have even higher expected utilities. Note also that，fulfilUng 
one no-quitting constraint (that is，last period wage equal to W^) implies fulfilUng 
all other no-quitting constraints in other periods. That is true in both models. 
6. Assuming the same SHC production function to both types of workers in both firms, 
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the difference between two equilibrium expected profits is : 
Ett^-ETT^ 
= 3 F ( 1 ) 对 - W 了 E-2W/-2F(2)J(mA+mB) + + 松 + W/^ 
+ if F is KD.l ‘ 
= -F ( l ) (nU+mB) + {[6-3/(l-GL)]WoL+[2/(l-GE)-4]WoE 
+[gE八 1-GE)-1 + [(1/(1-G^)-2]W/^ 
+[4/(1-GL)-4/(1-GE)]WJ ….(267) 
The last big bracket is uncertain in sign because some of the coefficients of the W's 
are positive and some are not 
The first bracket in (2.67) represents the higher output levels due to the 
encouraging effect on investment of late-toumament (Note that, relaxing the 
assumption on the functional form F does not give much extra intuition,) Hence, the 
relative size of En's depend on which term dominates. If we substitute (2.53) and 
(2.66)，into (2.67), then, the difference of the expected profits will become: 
EiT^-En^ 
=-[F(l)](m^ + {[6-3/(1-GL)�WoL+[2/(1-GE)-4JWoE 
+[3/(l-GL)-2/(l-GE)-2]Wm .•…(168) 
Under this heterogenous workers case，the sign of the difference of expected profits is 
uncertain. 
However, if workers are homogeneous in ability, then，the expected profit of the late-
toumament firm will exceed that of the early-tournament firm. This is because of the higher 
investment levels in the late-toumament firm and the absence of wage payment difference. 
Substituting gE=gL=1/2 into (2.67)j then, we find that the equilibrium Erc^ and Ett^ do 
not depend on the size of W^ and Wq^ because the change of Wq is just adjusted by the 
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change of equilihrium W2 Besides, (2.67) will be negative for all kinds of F function. This 
is because, as homogeneous workers are rewarded the same reservation utility in both firms, 
there will be no advantage in wage payment for firm L Hence，the excess output effect 
J 77* J? 责 
dominates and Et& > Ett^. 
Proposition 4 
If production function of SHC is more efficient，then, given other things constant, 
delaying tournaments will be more likely to increase the expected profit of firm. 
Proof: � 
It is shown in (2.67) that，given W^ and WQ^, as F，is larger for all % then 
F(a) will be larger and it is more likely that firm II will have a higher expected profit 
The intuition is that since early-tournament discourages investment, then given a 
more efficient SHC production function, the loss of future output will be larger. 
Besides, given SHC investment technology，as pre-toumament wage (WQ) 
decreases, the equilibrium expected profits of both firms will increase. And if workers 
are heterogeneous, the increase of expected profit of the firm with early-toumament 
is even larger. 
It is interesting to note that, the rise of W2 due to a per-unit decrease in Wq 
is smaller than the decrease of Wq, The reason is，in heterogeneous workers case， 
since the lower ability worker is facing a lower probability of winning，then, firms 
have to compensate more if it reduce Wq and in turn increase W2 Therefore，a fall 
8 Refer hack to the analysis before, homogeneity seems to be a given rather than a possible assumption. 
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in Wq will reduce expected profit (This result will be absent if workers are 
homogeneous.) This is shown in substituting equilibrium PF)五肌d Wj^ in (2.49) “ and 
(2.62)，into their respective expected profit function. 
=3F(l)(mA+mB)-WJ4+2/(l-GE)]-WoE[4-2/(l-GE)] .…(2.69) 
=2F(2)(mA+mB)-JVmf2+3/(l-GL) ]-WqL [6-3/(1-GL)] �…�(2 70) 
The coefficients ofW^ and W^ in (2.69) and (2.70) are positive since 
gE 
and gL > 1/2. Hence，given heterogeneous workers, it is always profitable to have 
a decrease in pre-toumament wage. 
A reduction of the reservation wage，W^, will increase expected profits of firm I less 
than that of firm II，if workers are heterogeneous. By (2.69) and (2.70), a decrease of W^ 
will increase both En's. However^ the increase of En is smaller since firm I is constrained 
by W^ in the last 2 periods. By (2.68)，the coefficient of W^ is positive. This is because as 
and keeping workers EU constraints, then decrease in W^ will decrease W2 more 
in late-toumament. Hence, the increase of En^ is larger. This is because, in heterogeneity 
case, less able workers receive a lower probability of promotion when they are competing with 
workers of higher ability in early-tournament firm G^ then firms have to spend more 
to compensate them. 
In homogeneous worker case，the effect of a change of W^^ will be. the samp to hnth 
firms. However, homogeneity of workers implies all workers receive the same EU, Hence， 
the total wage compensation is the same to both firms. A reduction in reservation wage will 
increase the expected profit of both firms by the same amount if workers are homogeneous. 
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Hence, given other things constant, coexistence of firm I and firm II in the same 
competitive market is possible only when workers are heterogeneous. If workers are 
homogeneous, under competitive market force, firm I will be driven out in equilibrium. 
f 
11. C. Conclusion 
In this chapter，a basic model of tournament with a no-quitting constraint is 
developed. To enhance workers's effort，firms can increase the wage prize difference by 
reducing the loser's wage only. This contradicts the usual argument of human capital theory 
that retaining skilled workers is beneficial to the firm. However, losing workers will surely 
leave the firm when they know that there is a better offer outside the firm after they lose. 
Hence, in equilibrium, firm will offer the minimum wage just enough to retain the losing 
skilled workers. While on the other hand, a wage gap will be offered to all workers in order 
to enhance their efforts which are unobservable to the firm. Besides，as an incentive device； 
tournament contract surely dominates flat wage contract if the cost of effort is not too large. 
The basic equilibrium wage profile is rising as shown in figure 1. Moreover, it is also shown 
that，keeping the wage prize difference the same, various wage contracts are equally efficient 
and preferable to the firms. Hence, I argue that the coexistence of different wage profiles in 
the competitive market is possible. Furthermore，the optimal labour size is also considered 
as another factor explaining why firms retain losing workers by not lowering the failing wage. 
In section ILB，the level of SHC is assumed as a choice variable. Two different 
,—models of firms with early-and late-tournaments are derived and Gompared, Generally > 
speaking，the investment profiles are different from the standard HC model and are not 
affected by the size of winning and losing wage difference. What determine the shape of the 
profile are only the SHC investment technology and the time when tournaments are carried 
47 
out And early-toumament discourages investment. Besides，the investment technology is 
important in determining the relative profitability of different hierarchical structures. As 
mentioned before, more efficient technology will favour firms of late-toumaments. This 
implies at least two things : 
1, As the technology of SHC investment advances over time，given other things constant， 
the equilibrium wage profiles will more likely rise in later periods. 
2 For industries with more efficient technology of SHC investment, for example, better 
training programmes, the equilibrium wage profile will rise in later periods, ’ 
The first point implies, over time, the equilibrium wage structures of firms will be 
flatter in early-period and rise more in later periods. The second point may imply large firms 
(which usually have better technology) will have such a wage structure. Although it is a 
tentative idea, from empirical studies on the wage structures of firms，one may find some 
(non) evidence. 
In summary, the primal objective is to find out the optimal wage profile which can 
both induce investment and keep skilled workers. However, in this chapter，we ignore any 
other obvious advantage of adopting tournament. If there are other advantages in using 
tournament, then it may he less costly to lose skilled workers. 
One may ask what the investment will be if there are more than one tournament 
during the whole time path (or whole hierarchy). Under this new situation, the investment 
just before a tournament will not be zero any more if there exist(s) tournament(s) in the 
future. This is because any investment just before a tournament increases workers' winning 
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probabilities in all future tournaments although it reduces the current competitive power of 
investors. Hence, the higher the prize ratios of future tournament (s) to current tournament， 
the higher will be the current investment levels. The reason is, at the margin，there is a larger 
1 
gain and smaller loss for workers to invest now. Hence，in equilibrium，there will be a direct 
relation between the relative wage prize ratios to optimal investment level The problem will 
be more complicated if the number of tournaments increases. However, not much new 
finding will be obtained. 
Although the case mentioned above is more realistic, the basic intuition (s) derived 
is (are) already captured in the simple model in this chapter. Hence, detail discussion and 
explicit modelling of this extension will not be made here. However, to make the matter more 
interesting, I would like to discuss this extended model in chapter III (point 3 in section 





and WoJ 二 C，- /(W/ - W/) - - WjJ) - ‘ 
= + 〜勺 + W从' ？〜'二 - WrI 
_ = (1-2G')W2J 
therefore, 1-2WqJ - WjJ - W^J = fl+2(2G^-1)]W2J 
and - p V _ � , = “ + 2 口 經 
By equations (2.17) & (2.18), we are going to solve two simultaneous equations : 
t [ 1 + 2 (2G工-1) ] W^-Wl) =-丫!A厂丫(Wi-W^) 




•广[1+2 (2G了-1) ] ； 
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and a=/，(W2l-W/) < 0 
-A^ - a yI ^a [ ] [ ] = [ - ] 
a - � Y b ^B 
t 
mI一 - 〒 • 丑 a 丫 A ；~ 
丄 - 厂 〒 # JB ； 广， 
Since a<0, then, y^ > 0 and 
YA > 0 if 
-w^A^yw^a 
YA <0 if 
That is, increasing e^^ is good to the fmn, and increasing will he good to firm if the ratio 
of marginal cost of compensation from the firm to workers is less than the marginal disutility 
to the worker, 
a 一 
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and note that, here W j W^ are greater or less than 0 depending on whether the total 
wage compensations owed to each worker are greater or smaller than the marginal utility loss 
to the opponent worker. 
2. 
Substituting (2.40) and (2.41) into the corresponding F.O.C.: 
a乂， gF/(a力(1-cc力mJW2-W�)+ Q乂 - g/ =" “…(2.40.1) 
olb\ gFB，(cc力(�-ccB2)mB(W2-Wj) + Q^�• 二 "…“(2.4U) 
a / , + e / _ 二 0 .....(2-40.2) 
a/ '8FB(ccB^)ms(W2-Wj) + 0/ - e / = 0 •".,(2.41.2) 
where 0 , and 0 , are the corresponding multipliers of (2.42.1) and G , and 0 , are that of 
(2.412). 
For simplicity, assuming that F(0) 二 0. Let's prove this result by contradiction. Assuming that 
equilihrium (^a^ = 0 = since F(0) = 0 is assumed, then which implies 
^A -^A -0' Hence, 1 > a^, a^ > 0. Substituting the results into equation (2.40.1), 
Bj^ < 0. This implies a乂 = 1. Similarly,以^】=1. ^nd these results contradict our 
presumption. 
If oc乂，a丑7 > 0，then，by (2.40.2), � 0 implying that 乂 仅 Substituting 
the result into (2,40.1), then ^a^'^a < 0 implies a^^ = 1. Similarly, And, these are 
the possible equilibria. En sum, workers will maximise the pre-toumament investment (1). 
Et is easy to understand because, without cost of investment，workers maximizing investment 
is maximizing the probability of winning. 
4. 
Refer back to the problem faced hy firm, firm chooses Wj^ to maximize the Lagrangian 
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function: 
L= [ (1-ai) .(1-aJ) +(1-0 + (1_0 ] 
+ [ (1-a^) + ( l - c4 ) + ( l - O + ( l - c4 ) F ^ l a ^ . a ^ ^ a , ) ] /n忍 
+ 入 月 ( 2 ^ ^ ( 1 _ ⑴ 乂 + % 一 3 3 
…..(2.44) 
广, 
We can eliminate inequality (238) because in equilibrium, EU^ > EU^ Then, as we 
substitute the equilibrium values of a^^^ = = 1 and = al"=2，3，4 and i=AA 
then (2.44) becomes: 
…..(2.44)， 
Note that A^ y/, j = l’2，i 二A，B are the corresponding Lagrangian multipliers to 
inequalities (239), (2.40,1)，(2,40.2)，(2.41.1) & (141.2). 
And the relevant F.O.C are : 
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Wj： -l + GAB-YA�gFi(���+l42gFJl)mA-YB�gFBV)mB+YB2gFBWmB = 0 
…..(2.46) 
WV -1 + a-G) V YaS^a V�nA + Ya'SFa (Vm^ + W � m ^ YB^SFEW^B = ^  
…..(2^47) 
Wf -2 +义B = 0 ".."(2.48) 
From equations (2.45) and/or (2.48)，义召 二 2 > 0 implies EU^ is binding. 
5. 
Now, firm chooses W^ W�and Wj and to maximize : 
Eii= [ (1-a^) +{l-al) ^{1-al) + (i-a^) F^ (a^+a^+a^) ] it?^ 
+ [ (1-a^) ^{1-al) F^ial) +{l-al) i^5(ai+ai+€ei�]m 只 
-SNq-W^-W^ 
subject to 
EU^ =3Wg + G(W2-WJ) + Wj > 打 ……(155) 
EU^ =3Wg+ (1-G)(W2-Wj) + Wj > 4炉爪 ......(2.56) 
a j e argmax EU^ (257) 
subject to (2.42) and (2,42.1) 
a^ e argmax EUq (2.58) 
subject to (2,42) and (2.42.1) 
i=A，B，j 二 1,2,3，4 
Where the only difference in the objective function (s) is (are) the absence of Wj but the 
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addition of two JV^ And (2.55) and (2,57) differs from (138), (2.39) also by the absence 
of Wj and additional JV^ 
f 
Similarly, the F.O.C of (157) and (2.58), will be : 
ccj： g/V(a7 + a � " - a � m � f W V 炉 + = " ..…(2.57.1) 
a j : - gF^'(a^7 + a力(1.a力m^(B^JVj) + G^^-g/ = 0 ..…(2.57.2) 
a j : -gF^ (oA 1 + (W2- = 0 ..... (2.57.3) 
c^B�: SFbW + a / ) + =0 .•…(2.58.1) 
a / : 容 + + = ..."(2.58.2) 
a / : - g / y a / + + = 0 •.…(213广 
where e/ and Q产 and are the corresponding multipliers of (2.42); and e产，G^ and e/^ 
are that of (2.42.1). 
Since equations (2.57.1) and (2.57.2), (2.58.1) and (2.58.2) are exactly identical to 
each other, then a乂乙=朋d a^^ = Besides, by similar logic as before，they will 
all be equal to 1. And in equilibrium，Qi�=0，Q? = 0 and > 0, > 0. Furthermore, 
= 0 as shown in (2.57.3) and (2.58.3) where > 0 and ef = 0. 
6. 





after substituting the equilibrium results mentioned before. Similar RO.C. are derived and 
equilibrium implies EUq be binding. 
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CHAPTER III 
Theoretical Foundation of Experiments 
IIIA. Introduction 
In this chapter, some theories about tournaments are derived and discussed. As a 
validation, all the theories will be tested in the experiments in chapter TV. 
Here, the main concern is what a tournament will he if contestants and promotion 
class sizes are different. In many previous studies，the number of competitors is fvva 
However, in reality, there are many different sizes of contestants. Besides, promotion class 
sizes significantly affect effort elicitation. This also affects the choice of different promotion 
classes or hierarchy sizes to firms. Intuitively, in any tournament, the more the number of 
competitors can be promoted, the lesser the effort each competitor pays because it is easier 
for them to succeed. On the other hand, if the number of promoting people is too small， 
one may be also uninterested to work too hard because of the low probability of success. 
This differs from previous study in which the effect of promotion size on effort is ignored. 
Hence, I would extend the tournament model into an n-person game with variable 
promotion classes. 
As an extension of the one-toumament SHC model in chapter II，a two-toumament 
model is derived. The rationale is that, under the one-toumament model, the optimal 
investment level is maximized as shown in chapter 11. Hence, a more meaningful choice will 
only exist when there are more than one tournament. Besides, in reality, it is common that 
more than one tournament exist in different levels of hierarchy. Of course, other reasons of 
adopting many tournaments are important. However, for simplicity, we only emphsize on 
what the optimal choice of investment levels will he under the case of two-toumament 
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I I LB. Theoretical Foundation 
1. The problem of labour size and promotion class size 
As introduced before, in reality, contestants size is important in determining the 
outcome of tournament Workers, when searching for a job, care about how long they can 
he promoted, and how much more benefit they will obtain when promoted. Given other 
things constant, workers will prefer to join a small company because of the possible quicker 
promotion. Hence，that is why civil servants have less incentive to work harder than 
required. In the following, I will characterize the situation when promotion class size is an 
endogenised variable. 
The probabilities of promotion/winning under different labour sizes are affected 
mainly by the number of winners which is given to workers and the ability types of one-self 
and opponent workers. To simplify the matters, assuming that workers are homogeneous in 
abilities in a two-period model Hence, the probability of promotion for individual worker 
i, given size of total workers, N, and promotion size rj, is 
P( r= r J iV , G) 严 卞 - G 厂 - 1 
f^i r - 1 
…..(3.1) 
where G is the probability of winning another one worker，that is, 
G = pfvb(ei + iMj > €2作2) 
= p r o b ( e f e 2 > fJ^�'口】) 
And the expected utility of worker is: 
EU = WG+P(W2-WJ) + WJ-C(E) 
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and the equilibrium effort level(s) is (are) determined by the F.O.C. of the above equation: 
p{l=l^\N, G) {W^-W^) =C丨 
I 
where p(r•二 rj\N，G) is the p.d.f. of and equals to ‘ 




Y ( ) ( i V - 2 r + l ) .‘• equilibrium G=l-G 
r = l 丄丄 
…"(3.2) 
The folio wings are some characteristics of the L.H.S. of (3,1), or the equilibrium 
effort function, given constant MC, C\ 
Proposition I 
Given worker size and wages, the optimal effort profile is concave in promotion class 
size. 
Proof 
Since the RO,C. is characterized only by a discrete p.d.f. function, hence, I try to 
prove concavity by checking the difference between two optimal effort levels. The 
difference are determined by the difference between 
p(r=rj I N, G) and p(r 二r^ + d | N，G) where d is a positive integer and N and (W2' 
Wj) are kept unchange here. And since 
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r 广d _ ^ 一 1 
+ 二gGN-o^Yj ( _ ) (iV-2r+l) 
1=1 •^一 1 
t 
… " ( 3 3 ) 
then， 
p ( r = r j i \ ^ , G) - p(r=r^+d\Nr G) 
N-1 ri+d A7-1 
A7_-i 了 1 AT-l 丄 AT-l 
=摊[公（_ ) ( ) ( ) (N-2r^l)] 
r=l •^-1 r=l r - 1 了-丄 
d N-1 
= - 购 ( ) {N-2r^l)] -
r=ri P I 
i 0 i f N-2i^l I 0 




Hence, the profile peaks at (N+l)/2 = r，that is, approximately at the mid-point of 
total population. Points beyond and before (N+l)/2 is lower. Hence, the profile is 
maximized at (N+l)/2 =r. Note that, it can be inferred by observing (3.1). In fact, (3.1) 
looks like a binomial process (whose mean = N(l/2)) and the profile is concave since 
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^(rJ) is concave. Hence, p in (3.2) is also concave�too. 
The degree of concavity can also be more clearly shown by: 
[p(r,4-d) - p ( r , ) ] 一 [p ( r ,+2d) - p ( r i + d � ] 
[ y ( ) {N-2r^l)]-[ T ( ) (iV-2r4-i)] 
工-1 i - d 工-1 
i f (7\^-2r+l) >0, V r < r i + 2 d < ^ ^ 
then (3.5) will be negative since 
E C ) < E C ) 
Hence, effort profile is increasing at an increasing rate and concave. (Please refer to figure 
1 in next chapter.) Besides, given worker size, the optimal promotion class size maximizing 
effort levels is 1/2 of total number of workers. This is already shown above since the curve 
peaks at (N+l)/2. 
Proposition 2 
As N increases, the distribution of optimal effort levels will shift rightward. 
Proof 
61 
At first, since the cwve is concave and the mid-point will increases in N. Besides, as 
we hold rj = l, that is, at the first point in the left, and increase N，then 
p(md) -p(N) 
二帅碗-2 ⑶ ( 1 ) +1) - { N - 2 (1) +1〉] , 
=师制-2 { m d - D [ N - D ] 
( {N-l^d) (G^-1) +d] 
…..(3-6) 
This is greater or less than 0 if 
(N -l+d)(l-G'^)id 
(N-1) ^ Gd(N-l+d) 
(N-l)/(N-l+d)lGd 
or l+d/(N-l)川Gd "…(3.6” ^ 
(3.6) > 0 is more likely for G = 1/2 only when N is small Hence, if N is large, then (3.6)' 
< 0 is likely. That is, keeping r�二 1 the optimal effort is smaller as N increases. 
And now, as we hold rj =N-1, that is，at the last point in the right, and increases N 
from Nj to N^ then, 
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p(r=iVi-1) 
=Sr[G"i-2(iVi-l) ( A - 2 r + l ) - G 巧 i V l ) E (%-2二 + 1) 口 J 今 ] 
r=l r=l 丄\ 丄丄 
> 0 if 》G巧 
.‘‘ ^ (i\/"i-2r+l) = (N^-1) (iVi + 1) r 
r=l r=l 
= - 1 
…..(3.7) 
and (3.7) < 0 is veiy likely. Hence, at the end point, p and also the optimal effort levels will 
be higher as N increases. 
By (3.6), (3.6)' and (3.7), we conjecture that the optimal effort profile will shift 
rightward as N increases. 
Proposition 3 
Given worker size, the optimal effort profile is symmetric. 
Proof 
Symmetry can be proved by first checking the total area before and after the mid-
6J 
point Letting p^(r) and p^(r) be the marginal probabilities after and before the mid-point, 
for all r < (N+I)/2, then, 




^ AT-1 r N-1 
( J (斤一2r + l ) ) ( ^ - 2 r + l ) , , 
g N-r 
二 N-1 N_l、 
〜石 ( r 一 i m - 2 r + l ) ... W = W 
…..(3-9) 
From the results above, we conjecture that there are always two promotion class sizes 
correspond to one same level of optimal effort. Hence, firm will be indifferent to these two 
promotion class sizes. 
From (3.9), we find the symmetry of the p profile. And we conjecture that areas 
before and after (N+l)/2 is approximately (1/2) A^ where A,^^ is the total arecL 
2.Score accumulation model 
In reality, some sequential tournaments adopt a ranking scheme such that previous 
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performance or scores obtained by contestants are considered also as factors determining the 
success or failure in future tournaments. Obvious examples are when promotion is 
completely or partially determined by worker's past performance evaluation; and when some 
» 
competitions taking into consideration of competitors' output/performance over some range 
of time. 
So, to see what the optimal effort levels will be，the following assumptions are made: 
1. It is a three period model and a tournament is held at the end of the second period. 
This is because contestants need one more period to invest 
2 Winner is defined as the one with highest total output (q]+q2)> where subscripts 1 and 
2 denote periods 1 and 2 correspondingly. ‘ 
3. All homogenous subjects decide their optimal level of efforts and the outputs are subject 
to a stochastic shock independent across time. 
Hence, the probability of promotion to worker i is 
prob ( qij + qi2� 
=pwb (ei] + ei2-ej2-ej2 > My + My-MfM/j 
=户（〜7 + A-2-勺厂力2) ..…(3.10) 
where e" is the effort level In period t, l = i, j and k = l, 2. 
Since fi- are independent and distributed as (0, a^), then , p, the p.d.f” is distributed as (0， 
4<j2). The expected utility of worker i is: 
EU= Wo + Wj + e-2-ejj-ej2) (Wy W^) + W2- Cfe + e-^) •.…(3.11) 
If workers have to choose both periods e's once at the beginning of first period, (I call 
this as one-shot decision), then, the corresponding F.O.C. are: 
eu： piWyW^) = C 
t 二 1，2 for all I..." (3.12) 
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Hence，equilihrium efforts will he:〜/二己/2* 二 二 勺 2 : the last second equality is 
derived only if workers are homogeneous in ability. 
However, if workers are to decide effort at the beginning of each period and are 
• f 
allowed to know the relative performance at the end of first period, then, the corresponding 
RO.C. will he: 
en： P ( � 、 + 妒 � 二 C，..…(3.12)， 
ei2: P(ei2-ej21力厂彻妒y炉2) 二 C，•.…(3.13) 
The p in (3.12)，is the same as that in (3.12) because at the beginning of first period, 
workers' choice are affected by the two periods，random shocks and hence，p �（0，4g2)�On 
the other hand，after the first period, workers acknowledge the realized first period's output 
And hence, their choices are only subject to the first period's random shock, p�(0，2o ). 
By (3.13), the realized output difference will affect their second choice. 




<p(0\2a^ 0) ifqjj^qu 
p ( 0 1 . . . . . (3.14) 
* * 
The last inequality gives indeterminate relative sizes of e � u n l e s s information of q^j-q^ 
is known. If qjfqu > 0, then, increases in this difference will make p fall and e�* is likely 
* 
to he smaller than e"，for all I That is, to worker i，as the relative disadvantage increases, 
the second period optimal efforts will fall. The intuition is that when workers are facing a 
given disadvantage, they have to pay more effort if they are to win at the same winning 
probability when disadvantage is absent. This is also true for j, for as his/her advantage 
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increases, he/she will have lesser incentive to elicit a high effort level Refer to figure 1’ if 
qj2-qi2 is small in absolute size, then, 勺 > Pj(0\4a^). Otherwise, p^(0\2o^) < 
> 
卞 (0 )——A. A �� 
： i J > 
1) 
Note that the equilibrium probability of promotion for i decreases if 力 厂 > 0 and vice 
versa because at equilibrium e-2 -力2*，肌d cjjj -q-j > 0 = Refer to figure 1， 
Where p^ and P^ are the original p.cLf. and equilibrium probability in period 1 and 2 
correspondingly and t 二 1，2. Therefore, the greater the size of qjj-q^, the greater the falls 
in equilibrium probability. 
3. Two-toumament SHC model 
In chapter II, a one-toumament SHC model is developed, in which，equilibrium 
investment level of SHC is maximized. However, as mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter, it is more realistic to assume more than one tournament over the hierarchy. 
Intuitively, the investment just before a tournament will surely be zero because it reduces the 
output and hence the competitive power of an investor. Positive investment is only possible 
when there is strong future return derived from present investment although it reduces current 
productivity and competitive power. 
I 
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The analysis here will concentrate on what the equilibrium investment level be when 
there are two consecutive tournaments. In equilihnum, there will be positive investments 
depending on the two prize differences. 
i 
Retaining the assumptions 3，4, 6 and 7 in section (II.B.l) of chapter II，we add : 
1") It is a three-period model Two tournaments are situated at the end of the second 
and third periods, (Introducing three periods are necessary because only a long 
enough relation will make the comparison between firms with different numbers of 
tournaments meaningful) 
2") A fixed payment, W^y is offered in period one. And P F �騰 the winning and 
losing wages in the first tournament, while W^ Wj are that for the "second 
tournaments. 
5") The probability of winning for ^ in the first tournament 
is G 二 prob( q乂 > q^) 
二 prob > I^b卞A) 
with a p.d.f. g belongs to distribution with (0，since ji广(0，a^) and all non-firm-
specific investment is not productive to firms. 
And, the corresponding probability of B will be 二 1-G. The probability of winning 
for B in the second tournament is 
P = prob ( q j > 处勺 
=prob ((�-a力FJa力mA(l-ocB)FB(aB�)mB > Mr〜） 
with also a p.cLf. p~(0，2o2) 
Then, 1-P is the probability of winning of B in the second tournament 
For convenience, let's denote all the equilibrium variables by "11" for the two-
tournament firm. 
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Hence, the respective expected utilities will be: 
EU^ = W(j+G(W2-Wj) + + ..…(3.15) 
EUB = WG + (1-G)(W2-WJ) + (1-P) (W^ W^) + + •.…(3.16) 
f 
Again, maximising utility will give us the first order conditions: 
( 3 . 1 7 ) 
( 3 . 1 8 ) 
cf W^-W^ 
The equilibria are: ql^ - a^ =0 because any investment just before the second 
tournament will only reduce workers' second period output and derive no any future gain. 
Hence, the equilibrium a乂 and a^^ will purely depend on the wage ratio, W^W^ and W2~ 
WJ. Then，Q^��々阶2"炉7, W^-W^) and cc^^ = (V^R^p W^-W^) and AJ, a^ will be 
positive if the R.H.S. of (3.17) and/or (3.18) are positive. 
For simplicity, let's assume identical SHCproduction function, that is, F乂=Fb，=F， 
for all a-, i=A, B. That is, workers' ability difference is only reflected in the ability 
coefficients but not in the investment technology. Then, the equilibrium probability of 
winning will be: 
G" = GlI[(l-ccm)(ni,mB)l > 1/2 
尸77 = 〉 > 1/2. In other words, 
Proposition 4 
Under two-toumament SHC model, to the higher ability workers, the probability of 
winning in the first tournament is larger than that of the second tournament 
can he any value since, given zero cost of investment, workers are indifferent as 
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to whether to invest or not in the last period. Of course, finns will prefer zero investment 
because this reduces output in period three. Hence, let's assume a 严I = 0 for future analysis. 
The equilibrium wage profile can be solved by maximising the expected profit: 
f 
E7r=[(�-cx力+ (l-cc力 FJa力 + + 
…“(3.19) 
subject to (3.15) and (3,16) both not less than SW,” and the F.O.C. in (3.17) and (3J8). 
From the RO.C】，we find that constraint (3,16) is binding. Then, (3.16) becomes 
(1-G)(W2- WJ) ^(1-P)(W^ W^) + + + 二 ……〔3.2� 
Hence，the equilibrium wage profile depends on the size of equilibrium F'p/g. Since 
the main concern is on the pattern of the equilibrium investment levels, I will try to validate 
the theoretical predictions mentioned before in experiments 37 an 38. To make the result 
dear and easy to interpret, a simple SHC production functional form will be assumed� 
1 The F.O.C. are shown in appendix. 
^ Detailed discussion on the design will be carried out in chapter IV. 
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Appendix 
The corresponding F.O.C, of the problem is 
Wq： + = 0 
(W2-Wj): (-CC，…+ 2Fy(x，A�)mA + (-a，B� + 2FB，cc，B�)mB-H 久B-g(YA�mA + YBimB)=。， 
(W^W^): (-a，A + 2FA，cc，A2)mA + (-a，B2 + 2FB，a，B2)mB 小P“-p(YAlFA，mA+ YB�FB，mB)-
P(rA2^A^A + 二 � 






Of all the literature about tournaments, experimental works is rare. However, as 
pointed out by Smith(1976), the values of experiment in economics are that: experimental 
studies "can serve as a rigorous empirical pretest of economic theory prior to the use of field 
data tests" (pp.274) and "the results can be directly relevant to the study and interpretation 
of field data". These are also my objectives of doing these experiments. Besides，another 
main objective is to validate the theoretical predictions and propositions 1 to 3 mentioned 
in chapter 111，wanting to know if people make consistent choice when they are putJnto the 
controlled situation, which is，in fact，a model of reality. Bull, Schotter & Weigelt (B.S.W.) 
(1987) made the first attempt to conduct an experiment on validating the predictions of 
Lazear &. Rosen's model (1981). In their experiments, 225 paid undergraduate student 
volunteers were employed to participate in 10 independent experiments. Six hypotheses were 
tested according to the following first order condition: 
{M-m) c 一 e 
4 a ~ 
…"(4.1) 
where M-m is the difference of the winning and losing prizes. A quadratic cost of efforts: 
cost(e) == e^/c and uniform distribution of random noise with upper and lower hounds [a,-
a] are assumed. Based on Lazear and Rosen's model, subjects are paired in all games. 
However, as mentioned in chapter III, the promotion class size is an important factor 
determining the optimal effort level of workers. Hence, in this chapter，we are going to test 
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the theories derived. The main objective of this experiment is to find out: 
1. given promotion class size, as the number of competitors changes, how the effort 
levels change; 
2. given the numbers of competitors, as the size of promotion class size changes, how 
the effort levels change. 
These two objectives comes from propositions 1 to 3 in chapter III Explicit hypotheses will 
be illuminated later. 
IV.B. Experimental Design 
1. “ 
There are totally 38 experiments held in my study. The brief outline of each 
experiment is shown in table 1 in appendix. Before all, as a primal comparison，four 
experiments (experiments 1,2,3 and 4) similar to B.S.W.'s are held In these four 
experiments, equation (4,1) is adopted. Different prize differential, M-m, and heterogeneous 
subjects are exogenously given in these experiments. In experiment 1，the "pairwise, 
homogenous S： small prize dijferential" experiment, homogenous subjects are paired up 
competing for a small prize differentials, $2,00-$L67=$0.33. Besides, a quadratic cost 
structure, cost = e^/c .....(4.2) Is adopted. Hence, the marginal cost, MC = 2e/c 
..…(4.3). c is a constant cost coefficient. And a uniform distribution of the stochastic 





which is the same as B.S.W/s. g=l/2d which is constant over all e. Assuming that 
* 
c 二10000 and d=40，then, according to the above equation, optimal e will be: 
10000 __ ^^ ^ , 
4d 4 ( 4 0 ) 2 1 
Hence, the theoretical equilibrium efforts will be equal to 21 and 83 in experiments 
1 and 2 correspondingly. In experiment 2，the "pairwise, homogeneous & large prize 
differential" experiment, the conditions are the same as experiment 1 except that W2�Wj 
becomes $3.00'$L67=$L33, which is larger. In experiments 3 and 4，the "pairwise, 
heterogenous & small prize differential" and "pairwise, heterogenous & larger prize 
differential" half of the subjects are randomly assigned as advantaged, that is, they have a 
lower cost coefficient c =20000. Subjects，are paired in such a way that one advantaged is 
to compete with one disadvantaged. Again, experiment 3 is for the small prize differential 
and experiment 4 is for large prize differential. The theoretical equilibrium efforts for the 
disadvantaged in experiments 3 and 4 will be equal to 21 and 83 and that for the 
advantaged will be 42 and 166. The main concern is to find out how the optimal effort 
levels respond to different prize differences and different opponents' abilities. As predicted 
in equation (4,1), the larger the prize difference and/or the higher one's ability, the higher 
the optimal level of effort will be. Experiments 5 to 34 (totally 30 experiments) are designed 
to test propositions 1 to 3 in chapter III and the predictions mentioned in the promotion 
model We try to limit the analysis into three cases: when contestant sizes (N) are 4，6 and 
8. For each contestant size, different feasible promotion class sizes are discussed. In the first 
15 experiments mentioned, the small prize differential，$0.33，is used. For experiments 5 to 
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7，4 subjects were made in a group and compete among themselves under different 
promotion sizes. Hence, in experiments 5，6 and 7, the corresponding promotion class sizes 
(Np) will be I, 2 and 3. According to equation (4.1), the equilibrium efforts are 16,31 and 
16 correspondingly^ Theoretically, the effort levels should be smaller when the promotion 
class sizes are low or high. Similarly, in experiments 8 to 12，the promotion class sizes are 
1,2,3,4 and 5 correspondingly. All other conditions will be the same as before. In 
experiments 13 to 19, there will be 7 feasible experiments. All these experiments are denoted 
by their respective N^N and sizeS of prize differential in table I. Experiments 20 to 34 are 
only a repetition of 5 to 19 with a larger prize difference $3-$ 1.67 = $1.33. In another 15 
experiments, experiments 20 to 22 are similar to experiments 5 to 7, experiments 23 to 27 are 
similar to experiment 8 to 12, and experiments 28 to 34 are similar to experiments 13 to 19. 
Hence, higher effort levels are predicted because of the greater prize difference. 
Hence, the equilibrium effort under these three different N，s and different N^s are 
therefore concave and symmetric. These are shown in figure 1. All we want to know is 
whether the experimental choices are consistent with the prediction. Two scores 
accumulation experiments (experiments 35 and 36) and two cumulative specific human 
capital(SHC) experiments (experiments 37 and 38) derived in chapter III are held. The two 
score accumulation experiments are designed to enrich a similar one in B.S.W.'s. In the 
latter study, information of opponents'previous performance being revealed after each round. 
And the experimental result deviated from predicted. Hence, they explained the result by 
quoting this as "information effect". Here, to analyze the matter more rigorously, a similar 
two-stage game with revealed information is also held. And the changes of optimal effort 
are captured by the difference of subjects' previous perfonnance and the probability 
�Calculation of p's which are denoted by g^j, are shown in table 1. 
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distribution of the random term. For experiments 35 and 36, if using a uniform distribution 
of random shock, then the marginal probability does not vary with the first period's 
performance difference. Therefore, we used a new pool of randomized balls with normal 
> 
distribution (of mean 二 0，variance 二 25) is used. The numbers of balls range from -11 to 11. 
Smaller prize structure, $1.33, is used. According to (3.12) or (3.12)，，the equilibrium levels 
of efforts of experiments 35 are found by solving: 
…"(3.12) ^ 
that is , e^256 for both first and second periods. However, in equilibrium, 
cost(e) = cost(256) 二 $6.5536 and total cost = $13.1072 which far exceeds the winning prize! 
Since subjects do not expect to lose money even when they lose, they will choose a smaller 
number according to: 
C(ej) + C(e2)么 1.67 二 E^j，hence, the equilibrium ei=e2 么 91, For experiment 36, 
testing the sequential score accumulation model, (3.12)' and (3.13) will become: 
• ^ e x p { 0 } ( „ ) = ‘ 
…..(3J2)" 
4a2 " ‘ 5 0 0 0 
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…..(3.13)， 
Hence, by the same logic as in experiment 35, first period equilibrium e will also be smaller 
than 91. And the second period equilibrium e depends on the realized size of qjj-qn- , 
The cumulative SHC experiments are also based on the model developed in chapter 
IIL We assume that the production function takes the form: F = Aa^'^ where 0 < a < 1 
is the choice variable,level of investment. Hence, marginal product equals to F，= (1-fi) A 
a'fi > 0 with F"= be the rate of change. Assuming A =2 and fi = 0.8, m^=5 
and rriB 二3 be the ability coefficients employed in experiments 37 and 38. Subjects are 
homogeneous in each experiments. Employing different ability coefficients is because we 
want to test if the choice of SHC is independent with ability as predicted in theory. W^ 
W^ = $3-$L67 and ！^：-炉/二只represents the second and first tournament prizes 
differences. Given the above information, output in the first tournament will be 3(l-a)mi 
and output in the second tournament will be Sa^'^m^, i=A，B. Here, assuming a = 0 in the 
second tournament. With uniform distribution of stochastic terms, equation (3.17) or (3.18) 
becomes: 
(0.2)(3) a-0.8 = (3-1.67)/(2-1,67) 
and equilibrium a* = 0,71. The equilibrium values are the same in both tournaments 
because, theoretically, the choice are independent of ability coefficients. 
2 
Recruitment starts from early April Students from any discipline and any year of 
study are eligible. About 72 students are needed. The first experiment was held in early 
May. Every subject spent about one hour in each session in which several experiments were 
conducted. In different experiments, different number of subjects are required. On average， 
there are 8 subjects in one session. All the 4-person games were done by employing two to 
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three groups of subjects simultaneously. This is to save time and guarantee a reasonable 
income per session for each subject 
3. 
> 
In all experiments, subjects sit in a circle as a group. In experiments 1 to 4 and 36 
to 38，they are paired up. Each of them is given a sheet of "Instruction for Experiment"， 
several "payoff record sheets" and a "decision cost table". In experiments 37 and 38，a 
"decision table" was given instead of the "decision cost table". 
After subjects choose their decision number，they will pick a ball from a pool of 
random numbers, which is his/her luck factor. Recording and summing the decision number 
and random number in column three in the payoff record sheet, they will be told if their 
totals are larger or smaller than others (their opponents). The number of winners is specified 
by the size of N^ in each individual experiment Those who win will circle the $X amount 
and others circle $Y which are their earnings respectively. Earning minus decision cost will 
he their net payoff (column 6 in the payoff record sheets). After repeating this process for 
certain rounds^ at last, they can calculate the total payoff by adding all the values in 
column 6 for all rounds they played. Fixed cost is ignored here. Information of opponents' 
choice of number and random number drawn in each round is not revealed, 
IV. C. Testing Hypotheses 
In this section，we are going to explicitly illuminate the hypotheses we want to test in 
these experiments. Hypotheses 1 to 3B are based on experiments 1 to 4. Hypotheses 4A to 
2 Samples are attached in appendix. 
3 The average number of rounds is four. This is determined by considering the minimum 
number of observations required in testing hypotheses and the average income to each 
participant 
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5B are hosed on experiments 5 to 34. Hypotheses 6A to 7C are hosed on experiments 35 
and 36. And hypotheses 8A to 8C are based on experiments 37 and 38. There are totally 
19 hypotheses being tested. , 
Hypothesis 1 
Effort levels derived by Nash equilihrium in pairwise tournament will not differ a lot 
from effort levels chosen in tournament 
This is quite a strong hypothesis in the seme that the effort levels chosen in the 
underlying population is nearly equal to the Nash equilibrium. Hence a weaker hypothesis 
will be: 
Hypothesis 2 
The average effort levels derived by Nash equilihrium in pairwise tournament will not 
differ a lot from effort levels chosen in tournament 
This is a weaker hypothesis which allows deviation of individual effort from the Nash 
equilihrium. In other words，the variance of efforts chosen can be non-zero. 
Hypothesis 3A 
The average effort level of advantaged subjects in pairwise tournament will not differ 
a lot from predicted. 
Hypothesis SB 
The average effort chosen by disadvantaged in pairwise tournament does not differ 
a lot from predicted. 
Hypotheses 3A and 3B are used to single out whether there is a difference in 
behaviour for different ability workers. It also tests whether they behave as predicted. 
Prediction in chapter III is that one will behave the same no matter he/she competes with 




The average effort levels chosen in the promotion class model does not differ a lot 
t 
from predicted. , 
This hypothesis is to test, in general, If the choices of subjects are consistent with prediction. 
Hypothesis 4B 
Given the same promotion class size, as the number of competitors increases, the 
average effort levels chosen change at a rate as predicted. 
Hypothesis 4C 
Given the same promotion class size, as the number of competitors increases, the 
average effort levels chosen change in the same direction as predicted. 
Note that in hypothesis 4C, the testing is weaker because sizes of increases in effort 
levels are allowed to be different from predicted In other words, only the sign of change is 
important. 
These two hypotheses are designed according to the first objective mentioned in 
section IV.A before. That is, we want to know, given N^ if e 本 increases/decreases as N 
increases as shown in figure L 
Hypothesis 5A 
Given the number of competitors, as the number of promoted subjects increases, the 
average effort levels are changing at a rate as predicted. 
Hypothesis 5B —… 
Given the number of competitors，as the number of promoted subjects increases, the 
average effort levels are increasing with the same sign of change as predicted, 
4 These four hypotheses are also tested in B.S.W. (1987). 
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These two hypotheses are designed according to the second objective mentioned 
before. Hence，we want to know, given N, if the e changes as also shown in figure 1. 
Hypothesis 6A 
> 
Given homogeneous subjects, the average first period effort levels chosen under one-
shot score-accumulation model will be as predicted. 
Hypothesis 6B 
Given homogeneous subjects, the average effort levels chosen under one-shot score 
accumulation model will he the same across both subjects and periods. 
Hypothesis 6C 
Given homogeneous subjects，the average effort levels chosen under one-skm score 
accumulation model will he the same across subjects. 
Hypothesis 6D 
Given homogeneous subjects, the average effort levels chosen under one-shot score 
accumulation model will he the same across periods. 
These four hypotheses are used to test the values of equilibrium Cj and e) in 
experiment 35. They are continuously "weaker" in the sense that the rejection of former 
hypothesis does not imply the rejection of later hypothesis. Since theory predicts that ei=e2 
across periods and subjects, hypotheses 6B to 6D are designed to find this out 
Similarly, the following three hypotheses are to test predictions on experiment 36. Since 
theory predicts only e/s are equal across subject but noi across period, only hypotheses 7C 
is tested. 
Hypothesis 7A 
Given homogeneous subjects, the average first period effort levels chosen under 
sequential score-accumulation model will be the same as predicted. 
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Hypothesis 7B 
Given homogeneous subjects, the average second period effort levels chosen under 
sequential score-accumulation model will be the same as predicted. 
Hypothesis 7C 
Given homogeneous subjects, the average second period effort levels chosen under 
sequential score-accumulation model will be the same across subjects as predicted. 
Hypothesis 8A 
Under two-tournament SHC model, choices of SHC will be equal to the predicted. 
Hypothesis 8B 
Under two-toumajnent SHC model，the average choices of SHC will be equal-to the 
predicted. 
Hypothesis 8C 
The choice of SHC is independent from ability coefficients� 
The last hypothesis is what we mentioned before. If the hypothesis is true, then, the 
distribution of e in both experiments 37 and 38 will he the same. Based on the hypotheses 
mentioned above, the results will he analyzed in the next section. 
TV. QExperimental Results 
1.Hypotheses I to 3B 
, � … I n hypothesis 1’ the experimental effotis levels are required to be equal to the 
theoretical In other words, the variance should be equal to zero. However, in table 2, the 
variance(s) in rounds 1 to 4 of experiments 1 to 4 are significantly different from zero 
although those of round 4 of experiments 1,2 and 4b are significantly lower than rounds 1 
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to 3. This means that as the games repeat, the chosen effort levels are more concentrated 
to certain levels. They are far from unique, however. Hence，generally speaking, Hypothesis 
1 is rejected^. , 
To test hypothesis 2, I use a median test to test if the theoretical and experimental 
mean effort levels are the same given a level of significance^. As a result, the hypothesis 
is rejected at a 95% level of significance for experiments 1 and 4b. It is not rejected for 
experiments 2，3 and 4a, In other words, for the former experiments, we have no strong 
confidence to believe that the experimental results are samples generated from the true 
(theoretical) and the same population and vice versa. Hence, Hypothesis 3A is rejected but 
3B is not rejected. This may he because the advantaged under-do a lot. For experiment 
4b, it is surprising that although the results are quite far below the predicted, 166，the mean 
effort in round 4 is larger than that of rounds 1 to 3 with a significant decrease in variance. 
This may imply a tendency towards the theoretical equilibrium. Although the experimental 
results of experiments 1 and 3a are quite similar as predicted, by using Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney (WMW) Test, the two distributions are rejected as treated to be equal By the same 
method, experiments 2 and 4a are also rejected to be treated as equal distributions. 
It is surprising to note that the variances are larger in games of large prize difference. 
Besides, the variances in homogeneous games are much smaller than that for the same 
ability subjects in heterogeneous ones. (The former is nearly 4 times higher). This may be 
5 This hypothesis vv^z? also rejected in B.S.W.'s experiments. 
6 A median test is used to test on the means of distribution because the theoretical 
variance on efforts is zero. Then, means equal to medians. All the testing procedures can be 
referred to Noether (1990). 
7 This result is just the reverse of B.S.W/s. In their papers, both advantaged and 
disadvantaged chose a larger than predicted levels of efforts. In present context，subjects may 
be risk-averse rather than risk-neutral Hence, they chose a small number. 
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explained by the strategic consideration. That is, when the low ability subjects were told and 
paired with a higher ability ones, they will put more effort to design strategy than when they 
are competing with opponents of equal ability. Or psychologically, the lower ability subjects 
f 
will become more pessimistic and will choose a much lower effort than the optimistic ones. 
2.Hypothesis 4 
Results of experiments 5 to 34 are used to test hypothesis 4A，4B and 4C. First of 
all, zero or small variances are not supported by observing the computed variances in those 
experiments. Besides, for all the 30 experiments, hypothesis 4A is not rejected for 7 
experiments only. However, among the other 22 rejected experiments, 15 of them show 
efforts approaching the predicted values and 9 of them show also a decreasing variance over 
time. Hence, there seems to be a tendency for the experimental values to approach the 
theoretical ones. Generally speaking, hypothesis 4A is rejected in most of the experiments. 
To test hypothesis 4B and 4C, comparison among groups of experiments are made. 
The groups are classified by promotion class size (N^). That is，for instance，given Np=l, 
as N varies, the relevant experiments will he 5 and 20 (for N-4), 8 and 23 (for N二6)，13 
and 28 (for N=8). (Please refer to table 1 or figure 1). Hence，the five groups are: 
i. experiments 5,8,13 and 20,23 dc 28 for = l 
a experiments 6,9J4 and 21,24 & 28 for N,2 
iii.experiments 7,10,15 and 22,25 & 29 for 
i�人 experiments 11，】6 and 26y3() for Np 二4 
V. experiments 12,17 and 27,31 for Np 二 5 
The theoretical and experimental rates of increases are computed in table 3A. 
As shown in table 3A, 9 out of 16 differences have the same signs of change as 
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predicted. The efforts chosen seem to be consistently higher than the expected when subject 
size increase from 6 to 8. That is, given the same promotion class size (Np = l，2，3)，as N 
increases from 4 to 6 (experiments 5 to 8，6 to 9 and 7 to 10), contestants reduce their 
efforts，but they increase it when N changes from 6 to 8. In other words, as subject sizes are 
small, their behaviour is more consistent with prediction. By the results above, hypothesis 
4C is not rejected for large N only. 
For the 9 differences having the same signs as predicted, as shown in column 7, 6 of 
which are smaller in absolute values than predicted. That is, for most of which，there is 
either an excess-doing in experiments of smaller promotion sizes or an under-doing in 
experiments of larger promotion sizes or both. As shown in figure 1，the effort profile is 
much flatter than predicted. If the difference of the changes are not large, then，the 
percentage difference (column 7 ) will give results which do not deviate much from zero. In 
fact，this ratio ranges from 1.824 to -11.4225. The average percentage difference (column 
8) closest to 0 is 0.02917. (This happens in the first few experiments in group 2). 
On average, the rate of changes closest to the theoretical ones appears in group 2, 
that is, when and W=$0.33. This can he observed by the value at column 8 in table 
3A in which the smaller the values implies the more alike the changes are. By the results 
above, it is difficult to state whether hypothesis 4B is likely to be true or untrue. Note that， 
it seems that the percentage difference is smaller in large N^. However, there does not seem 
to have significant difference between games of different prize differences. 
3.Hypothesis 5 
For Hypothesis 5A and 5B, the theoretical and experimental incremental efforts across 
Np are shown in columns 2 and 4 in table 3B. The difference of the experimental and 
theoretical rates of change can be found in column 6. If the difference is small，the values 
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in column 6 should approach zero. However, as observed in column 6, the values are 
unlikely to approach zero. Hence, hypotheses 5A is rejected. Among the 24 changes, there 
are 15 changes having the same incremental signs as predicted. Hence, more than half of 
the changes are consistent with the direction of change. Nevertheless, it is not a strong 
confidence to accept hypothesis 5B. Note that the result is more consistent with prediction 
when the prize difference is large. This is because, out of the 15 experiments, 9 of which 
appears in large prize difference games. Besides, 10 out of 15 experiments are experiments 
of Np > V2N. This may be because subjects understand more about the games as the N^ 
is larger. Besides, in experiments of small N^ the desire to win may be so large that it 
induces them to choose a larger number than expected^. This can also he observed in 
column 6 in which some experiments have values closer to zero. 
As shown in column 6 in table 3B, the percentage difference between theoretical and 
experimental changes are generally negative in sign. In other words, the slope of the 
experimental effort profile is flatter than predicted. Out of the 6 groups, group of N二 4 and 
has the average percentage differences closest to zero, that is, the result fits the best 
among all others. However, there does not seem to have an obvious trend of this error 
across different N. 
In view of the unsatisfactoiy results, I try to modify the model by replacing the 
assumption of risk neutrality by risk aversion. Hence, the utility function U should fulfil IT 
> 0 and U" < 0 where U，and U" are the first and second derivatives respectively. Beside 
the pecuniaiy return, we also assume the existence of winning satisfaction, S. I further 
assume that S is decreasing in the ratio of promotion class size to the number of total 
8 Although this is intuitive, it is quite a reasonable giiess and are told by several subjects 
at the end of experiments. 
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competitors at an increasing rate. That is, given the number of the total contestants，as the 
promotion class increases, contestants derive lesser satisfaction from winning. Besides, there 
is a dissatisfaction of losing just equal to the satisfaction of winning in size. The 
» 
dissatisfaction will be deducted from the losing prize as a reduction of utility. Hence, the 
functional form of utility function is assumed as: 
In (W2+fi(l-Np/Nf) when i wins 
U = tin (Wj-fi(]-N/Nfy when i loses 
where fi(l-N乂be the function converting satisfaction into pecuniary rewards. And note 
also that: 
dU 1 d^U 1 — ~ =——, = - <0 
^^J � d f v � vi] 
j= 1,2 and _ 
导” - i < Q , (大—1) ( i - : ^ ” - 2 
N N 
^ Oifk'llO 
Substituting k 二 2，fi =1 into the utility function and re-estimate the equilibrium effort levels 
for experiments 5 to 34，the new equilibria are shown in table 3B.L Hypothesis 5A is then 
accepted in 15 experiments under this new setting. Hence, winning satisfaction and risk 
aversion seem to be two missing factors in explaining tournament behaviour under the 
current context. 
<57 
Using the modified setting mentioned above, we test hypothesis 4A and 4B again and 
recalculate tables 3A as shown in tables 3A.1. In table 3A.I, there are 9 differences，same 
as before，showing the same sign as predicted. However, the average percentage differences 
become closer to zero for 2 groups, group 1 and group 3. And others are roughly same as 
before. Hence, there is a stronger evidence to support hypothesis 4B but not much extra for 
hypothesis 4C. 
From table 3B.1, it is obvious that all the average percentage differences are much 
smaller than that before. However, there are still 15 experiments which share the same sign 
of change. Hence, similar as before, we find a stronger reason to support hypothesis 5A but 
not much extra for hypothesis 5B, 
4. Hypothesis 6 
To test if e】，e) < 91, a one-sided median test confirms that the hypothesis 6A is not 
rejected at a 95% level of significance for both e； and e? ^ WMW test on experiments 35A 
and 35B shows that there is strong confidence to conclude that both distributions are the 
same. This validates what are expected in theory. Hence, hypothesis 6D is not rejected and 
is very likely to be true. Table 4 shows the mean and variances of first and second period's 
efforts classified by subjects. The small variances shown implies a very small difference of 
effort chosen among the subjects. Besides，in experiments 35, equal variances are expected 
for both e�and e: because subjects are expected to choose 已工二已？ ^^ table 2, the variance 
of 62 is 8% higher than that of e�,This is regarded as quite a small deviation, WMW tests 
on efforts classified by groups of subjects confinn that subject behaviour is very likely to be 
the same within group. Hence, hypotheses 6A, 6B and 6C are not rejected. Also note that 
the significant reduction in variance of round 4 implies convergence of effort towards the 
optimal effort levels. 
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5.Hypothesis 7 
For sequential score accumulation experiments, two experiments with different prizes 
are conducted. In experiment 36A, W2-Wj = $3-$1.67=$L33 is used. Hence, the predicted 
first and second equilibrium e's should not exceed 91. Again, a one-sided median test on 
it does not reject the hypothesis. In experiment 36B, a lower prize structures, W2'Wj=$2-
$1.67 ；$.33， 
TABLE 4 
Means of first and second periods's effort of experiment 35 
classified hy pairs of subjects 
Subjects Means (el) Means (el) 
lA 77.5 77.5 
IB 55.75 55.75 
24 61.25 58.5 
2B 57.5 39.5 
3A 54 50 
3B 67.5 66.25 
4A 55 62.5 
4B 60 615 ‘ 
Average 6L0625 59.0625 
Variance 55.04297 111.418 
will be correspond with an optimal effort level 66. However，hypothesis 7A here is rejected. 
Therefore, there is not strong confidence to confirm that subjects behave as the same as 
predicted all the time. 
To see if subjects behave similarly, refer to table 5 in which the means and variances 
of second period*s efforts across pairs of subjects are shown. Similar to testing Hypothesis 
6, the moderate variances implies consistent behaviour among subjects. Besides, there is 
strong confidence to accept the hypothesis that they are the same by using WMW tests. As 
a result, hypothesis 7B will not he rejected. 
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Although the equilibrium effort in the second period depends on the realized output 
difference in the first period，for convenience, we only show the predicted and experimental 
results of e2 for experiment 36B by pairs of subjects in table 6. In table 6，columns 2 and 
t 
3 are efforts of paired partners. Theoretically, the numbers in column 2 should be exactly 
equal to that in column 3, and in turn, numbers in both columns equal to that in column 
1. Hence, several WMW tests are used to compare numbers in column 1 to those in both 
column 2 and 3. Besides, tests on comparing the numbers in column 1 to that in columns 
2 and 3 individually and columns 2 to 3 together are also made. 
Table 5 
Table of second period's efforts(e2) in experiment 36A 
Pair Theoretical Experimental 
number e2 e2 
Column 1 column 2 column 3 
1 292 81 90 
2 368 100 90 -
3 0 0 0 
4 346 100 100 
5 0 70 0 
6 227 95 100 
7 0 68 0 
8 30 0 80 
9 183 70 80 
10 89 80 80 
11 89 90 75 
12 346 80 90 
13 0 70 80 
14 30 80 70 
15 0 30 0 
16 69 50 0 
Mean 129.31 614687 
Variance 18749.59 1286.24 
To all the test above, hypothesis 7C is not rejected at 95% level of significance. Table 6 
shows similarly data as table 5. Similar WMW tests are carried out as above. Again, all the 
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relevant tests support hypothesis 7C For experiment 36, larger variance for each pair of 
subjects is expected for e�than Cj because the realized first period's output difference is likely 
to deviate from zero. It is supported by the results because variances of in experiments 
36A and 36B are 32% and 10% higher than that of e�correspondingly. 
6. Hypothesis 8 
By using a median test, hypothesis 8B is supported at 95% level of significance for 
both experiments 37 and 38. Small variances also give support to hypothesis 8A that the 
choice is exactly equal to predicted. At last, WMW tests on experiments 37 and 38 give 
strong support that both distributions are the same. In other words, the choice of SHC is 
independent of ability factor as stated in hypothesis SC. 
7. Concluding Experimental Results 
Although the results of all experiments are not very consistent with prediction, as a 
personal comment, it is not a bad job. For convenience，status of tested hypotheses are 
shown in table 7. It is clear that inconsistent results are mainly found in hypothesis 4A on 
experiments 5 to 34. Other hypotheses are mostly accepted. The discrepancy between the 
expected and the actual results in the those experiments may be largely because subjects do 
not understand very well the games and there are too few repetitions of the games. Besides, 
the winning desire may he vety large especially in games of small N^, The model including 
risk aversion and winning satisfaction shown in point 3 of section IV. C already gives us 
stronger evidence on this prediction. In table 7, the improvement of result and changes of 
status of tested hypothesis are shown. 
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TV. D. Fin cil Conclusion 
As a final conclusion, I would like to compare the current experiments with that of 
B.S.W.. Several merit points of the experiments in this thesis are found: 
1. Of all the experiments similar to what B.S.W. (experiments I to 3) did, the variances 
of efforts chosen are significantly smaller than the original ones. That means, on 
average^ the subjects behaviour is more consistent and similar to the predicted one. 
This is surprisingly good because in their work, more rounds are being held. The 




Experiments Round 4 Total Round 12 Rounds 7 -12 
1 140.69 175.4 577.28 499.67 
2 629,11 990.87 1005.37 892,05 
3a 790 704 805.52 905.03 
3b 777 681 766.76 708.13 -
2 Experiment 36 is actually a partial explanation of experiment 5 of their studies in 
which the total number (effort number plus random number) is revealed after each 
round. 
In other words, the latter is actually a period-hy-period independent tournament with 
more information of past performance. And experiments here are trying to capture 
how the revelation of total number affects the future behaviour. Hence，in current 
context, a more rigorous model and a normal pool of random numbers are used to 
explain the behaviour. Rather, they explained their experimental result by using an 
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"infonnatlon effect" which is just a brief description^. 
3. It is surprisingly good that results are consistent with the expected with strong 
confidence in experiments 37 and 38. Although the game is the most complicated 
among all，subjects understand the games well enough. 
Table 6 
Table of second period's efforts(e2) in experiment 36B 
Pair Theoretical Experimental 
number e2 e2 
column I column 2 column 3 
1 0 0 50 
2 72 . 60 90 
‘ 3 0 0 50 “ 
4 0 0 90 
5 0 40 0 
6 3 50 50 
7 72 65 50 
8 89 55 10 
9 7 50 20 
10 7 0 20 ‘ 
11 34 10 15 
12 0 0 15 
13 0 51 0 
14 0 50 0 
15 0 61 0 
16 0 31 0 
Mean 17,75 30.71 
Variance 906.94 77L4 
Undeniably, there are some inadequacies in the setting of experiments such as the 
models, environmental and financial limitations. 
First of all, there are nearly 40 students helpers from arj^ discipline recruited to play 
9 However, a comparison of variance of e�in experiment 36 and that of original work 
shows that the variances of the current model are larger implying a lesser degree of 
convergence to the equilibrium. 
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the games. The number of participants are far smaller than 256 (the number of student-
volunteers in the original work of B.S.W,). Besides, in the original work, subjects played 12 
times in one experiment. And all subjects were Economics students who are supposed to be 
f 
more sensitive to numbers，mathematical calculation and even maximization. 
Besides, as mentioned before, a major factor, winning satisfaction may be ignored in 
the models and hence give incorrect prediction. Moreover，since experiments had to be held 
at the end of the school term and even during school examinations, it was difficult to recruit 
more students and to make the games more attractive. Of course, financial limitation 
constrained more repetition of games. 
All of the above may contribute to the poor results in certain experiments：' If it is 
financially possible, repetition of those experiments with poor results by recruiting new 
subjects and/or refinement on the models are expected to give more consistent results. 
Table 7 
Hypotheses Risk neutral Risk averse; satisfaction -
(Rejected (R) ； Accepted (A)) 
1 R … 
2 2R,3A … 
3A R … 
3B v4 — 
4A 8A,22R 15A，15R 
4B R* A 
4C R* R* 
SA R A 
SB R R 
6A A … 
6B A … 
6C A … 
6D A … 
Z4 lAJR … 
7B A — 
7C A — 
8A A — 
8B A … 
8C A … 
..I,...., . . , .、：••. I . • •‘ . 
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A p p e n d i x I V 
1. 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
T h i s i s a n e x p e r i m e n t a b o u t d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . T h e ins t ruc t i<pi！〒 a r e 
s i m p l e , a n d i f y o u f o l l o w t h e m c a r e f u l l y a n d m a k e g o o d d e c i s i o n ^ , 
y o u c o u l d e a r n a c o n s i d e r a b l e a m o u n t o f m o n e y , w h i c h w i l l b e p a i d 
t o y o u b y c a s h . 
S P E C I F I C INSTRUCTIONS ‘ 
As y o u r r e a d t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s y o u w i l l b e i n a r o o m w i t h a 
n u m b e r o f o t h e r s u b j e c t s . You w i l l b e p l a y i n g w i t h a l l o f t h e m 
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . 
I n t h e e x p e r i m e n t y o u w i l l p e r f o r m a s i m p l e t a s k . A t t a c h e d 
t o t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e t w o s h e e t s , l a b e l e d s h e e t 1 a n d sheet 
2 . S h e e t 1 ( t a b l e 1) s h o w s 1 0 0 n u m b e r s f r o m 0 t o 1 0 0 i n c o l u m n A . 
T h e s e a r e y o u r d e c i s i o n n u m b e r s . A s s o c i a t e d w i t h e a c h n u m b e r i s a 
d e c i s i o n c o s t , w h i c h i s l i s t e d i n c o l u m n B. N o t e t h a t t h e h i g h e r 
t h e d e c i s i o n n u m b e r c h o s e n , t h e g r e a t e r i s t h e a s s o c i a t e d c o s t � 
A l l s u b j e c t s h a v e a n i d e n t i c a l s h e e t . I n e a c h r o u n d o f : t h e 
e x p e r i m e n t , a l l o f y o u w i l l e a c h s e l e c t a d e c i s i o n n u m b e r 'sepa-=-
r a t e l y . R e c o r d y o u r n u m b e r i n c o l u m n 1 o f s h e e t 2 a n d r e c o r d i t s 
a s s o c i a t e d c o s t i n c o l u m n 5 o f s h e e t 2 . 
When a l l s u b j e c t s h a v e s e l e c t e d t h e i r d e c i s i o n n u m b e r s , an 
e x p e r i m e n t e r w i l l b r i n g a r o u n d a c a g e c o n t a i n i n g 8 1 b a l l s , m m -
b e r e d f o r m - 4 0 t o + 4 0 . E a c h o f y o u w i l l d r a w o n e o f t h e s e b a l l s � 
T h e n u m b e r o f t h i s b a l l w i l l b e c a l l e d y o u r r a n d o m d r a w n u m b e r � 
R e c o r d t h e r a n d o m d r a w n u m b e r i n c o l u m n 2 o f s h e e t 2 a n d - t h e n 
r e p l a c e t h e b a l l i n t h e c a g e . 
CALCULATION OF PAYOFFS 
Y o u r p a y m e n t i n e a c h r o u n d o f t h e e x p e r i m e n t w i l l b e c o m p u t e d a s 
f o l l o w s . You w i l l a d d y o u r d e c i s i o n n u m b e r a n d r a n d o m d r a w n u m b e r 
a n d r e c o r d t h i s sum i n c o l u m n 3 o f s h e e t 2 . A l l o t h e r s w i l l d o 
t h e s a m e . 
S i n c e a l l s u b j e c t s h a v e w o r k e d i n p r i v a c y , t h e e x p e r i m e n t e r 
w i l l t h e n c o m p a r e t h e t o t a l s o f a l l t h e s u b j e c t s , a n d y o u w i l l b e 
t o l d b y h o w much y o u r t o t a l i s g r e a t e r o r l e s s t h a n t h a t o f a l l 
/ o n e o p p o n e n t s . I f y o u r t o t a l i n c o l u m n 3 i s g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t o f 
a l l o t h e r s , y o u r e c e i v e t h e f i x e d p a y m e n t X ( $ 2 )； i f n o t y o u 
r e c e i v e a n o t h e r Y ( $ 1 . 6 7 ) . W h e t h e r y o u r e c e i v e X o r Y a s y o u r 
f i x e d p a y m e n t d e p e n d s o n l y o n w h e t h e r y o u r t o t a l i s g r e a t e r t h a n 
a l l o t h e r s ' . I t d o e s n o t d e p e n d on how much b i g g e r i t i s . C i r c l e 
t h e a p p r o p r i a t e f i x e d p a y m e n t i n c o l u m n 4 a n d s u b t r a c t , from 
c o l u m n 4 , t h e c o s t a s s o c i a t e d w i t h y o u r d e c i s i o n n u m b e r listed in 
c o l u m n 5 . R e c o r d t h i s d i f f e r e n c e i n c o l u m n 6 . T h i s a m o u n t i n 
c o l u m n 6 i s y o u r e a r n i n g s f o r t h e r o u n d . T h e e a r n i n g s o f a l l 
o t h e r s a r e c a l c u l a t e d i n e x a c t l y t h e s a m e w a y . I f m o r e t h a n o n e 
h a v e t h e h i g h e s t t o t a l i n c o l u m n 3 , a c o i n w i l l b e f l i p p e d s e -
q u e n t i a l l y w i t h t w o f o r e a c h f l i p t o d e t e r m i n e w h i c h f i x e d p a y -
m e n t y o u r e c e i v e . 
A f t e r r o u n d 1 i s c o m p l e t e d , y o u w i l l p e r f o r i n t h e s a m e p r o c e -
d u r e . T h a t i s , y o u w i l l c h o o s e a d e c i s i o n n u m b e r a g a i n ( t h o u g h o f 
c o u r s e y o u may p i c k t h e s a m e o n e ) , y o u w i l l d r a w a n o t h e r r a n d o m 
n u m b e r f r o m t h e c a g e , a n d y o u w i l l c a l c u l a t e a new p a y o f f . When 
r o u n d 3 i s c o m p l e t e d , a d d y o u r e a r n i n g s f r o m e a c h o f t h e r o u n d s 
a n d r e c o r d t h e t o t a l e a r n i n g s a t t h e b o t t o m o f s h e e t 2 . T h i s 
a m o u n t w i l l p a i d t o y o u b y c a s h l a t e r . 
T h a n k y o u v e r y much！ 
SHEET 1 i t 
DECISION COSTS TABLE(I) 
COLUMN A COLUMN B COLUMN A COLUMN B 
DECISION COST OF DECISION COST OF 
NUMBER DECISION NUMBER DECISION 
一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 
0 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 . 2 5 0 0 
1 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 1 0 . 2 6 0 1 
2 0 . 0 0 0 4 5 2 0 . 2 7 0 4 
3 0 . 0 0 0 9 5 3 0 . 2 8 0 9 
4 0 . 0 0 1 6 5 4 0 . 2 9 1 6 ， 
5 0 . 0 0 2 5 5 5 0 . 3 0 2 5 
6 0 . 0 0 3 6 5 6 0 . 3 1 3 6 
7 0 . 0 0 4 9 5 7 0 . 3 2 4 9 
8 0 . 0 0 6 4 5 8 0 . 3 3 6 4 
9 0 . 0 0 8 1 5 9 0 . 3 4 8 1 
1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 6 0 0 . 3 6 0 0 
1 1 0 . 0 1 2 1 6 1 0 . 3 7 2 1 
1 2 0 . 0 1 4 4 6 2 0 . 3 8 4 4 
1 3 0 . 0 1 6 9 6 3 0 . 3 9 6 9 
1 4 0 . 0 1 9 6 6 4 0 . 4 0 9 6 
1 5 0 . 0 2 2 5 6 5 0 . 4 2 2 5 
1 6 0 . 0 2 5 6 6 6 0 . 4 3 5 6 
1 7 0 . 0 2 8 9 6 7 0 . 4 4 8 9 
1 8 0 . 0 3 2 4 6 8 0 . 4 6 2 4 
1 9 0 . 0 3 6 1 6 9 0 . 4 7 6 1 :、： 
2 0 0 . 0 4 0 0 7 0 0 . 4 9 0 0 
2 1 0 . 0 4 4 1 7 1 0 . 5 0 4 1 
2 2 0 . 0 4 8 4 7 2 0 . 5 1 8 4 
2 3 0 . 0 5 2 9 7 3 0 . 5 3 2 9 
2 4 0 . 0 5 7 6 7 4 0 . 5 4 7 6 
2 5 0 . 0 6 2 5 7 5 0 . 5 6 2 5 
2 6 0 . 0 6 7 6 7 6 0 . 5 7 7 6 
2 7 0 . 0 7 2 9 7 7 0 . 5 9 2 9 
2 8 0 . 0 7 8 4 7 8 0 . 6 0 8 4 -
2 9 0 . 0 8 4 1 7 9 0 . 6 2 4 1 
3 0 0 . 0 9 0 0 8 0 0 . 6 4 0 0 
3 1 0 . 0 9 6 1 8 1 0 . 6 5 6 1 
3 2 0 . 1 0 2 4 8 2 0 . 6 7 2 4 
3 3 0 . 1 0 8 9 8 3 0 . 6 8 8 9 
3 4 0 . 1 1 5 6 8 4 0 . 7 0 5 6 
3 5 0 . 1 2 2 5 8 5 0 . 7 2 2 5 
3 6 0 . 1 2 9 6 8 6 0 . 7 3 9 6 
3 7 0 . 1 3 6 9 8 7 0 . 7 5 6 9 
3 8 0 . 1 4 4 4 8 8 0 . 7 7 4 4 
3 9 0 . 1 5 2 1 8 9 0 . 7 9 2 1 
4 0 0 . 1 6 0 0 9 0 0 . 8 1 0 0 
4 1 0 . 1 6 8 1 9 1 0 . 8 2 8 1 
4 2 0 . 1 7 6 4 9 2 0 . 8 4 6 4 
4 3 0 . 1 8 4 9 9 3 0 . 8 6 4 9 
4 4 0 . 1 9 3 6 9 4 0 . 8 8 3 6 
4 5 0 . 2 0 2 5 9 5 0 . 9 0 2 5 
4 6 0 . 2 1 1 6 9 6 0 . 9 2 1 6 
4 7 0 . 2 2 0 9 9 7 0 . 9 4 0 9 
4 8 0 . 2 3 0 4 9 8 0 . 9 6 0 4 
4 9 0 . 2 4 0 1 9 9 0 . 9 8 0 1 
100 1.0000 
SHEET 1 Hd 
DECISION COSTS TABLE ( 1 1 ) 
COLUMN A COLUMN B COLUMN A COLUMN B 
DECISION COST OF DECISION COST OF 
NUMBER DECISION NUMBER DECISION 
一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 一 
0 0 . 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 . 1 2 5 0 
1 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 1 0 . 1 3 0 1 
2 0 . 0 0 0 2 5 2 0 . 1 3 5 2 
3 0 . 0 0 0 5 5 3 0 . 1 4 0 5 
4 0 . 0 0 0 8 5 4 0 . 1 4 5 8 , 
5 0 . 0 0 1 3 5 5 0 . 1 5 1 3 
6 0 . 0 0 1 8 5 6 0 . 1 5 6 8 
7 0 . 0 0 2 5 5 7 0 . 1 6 2 5 
8 0 . 0 0 3 2 5 8 0 . 1 6 8 2 
9 0 . 0 0 4 1 5 9 0 . 1 7 4 1 
1 0 0 . 0 0 5 0 6 0 0 . 1 8 0 0 
11 0.0061 61 0 .1861 
1 2 0 . 0 0 7 2 6 2 0 . 1 9 2 2 
1 3 0 . 0 0 8 5 6 3 0 . 1 9 8 5 
1 4 0 . 0 0 9 8 6 4 0 . 2 0 4 8 
1 5 0 . 0 1 1 3 6 5 0 . 2 1 1 3 
1 6 0 . 0 1 2 8 6 6 0 . 2 1 7 8 
1 7 0 . 0 1 4 5 6 7 0 . 2 2 4 5 
1 8 0 . 0 1 6 2 6 8 0 . 2 3 1 2 
1 9 0 . 0 1 8 1 6 9 0 . 2 3 8 1 二 
2 0 0 . 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 . 2 4 5 0 
2 1 0 . 0 2 2 1 7 1 0 . 2 5 2 1 
2 2 0 . 0 2 4 2 7 2 0 . 2 5 9 2 
2 3 0 . 0 2 6 5 7 3 0 , 2 6 6 5 
2 4 0 . 0 2 8 8 7 4 0 . 2 7 3 8 
2 5 0 . 0 3 1 3 7 5 0 . 2 8 1 3 
2 6 0 . 0 3 3 8 7 6 0 . 2 8 8 8 
2 7 0 . 0 3 6 5 7 7 0 . 2 9 6 5 
2 8 0 . 0 3 9 2 7 8 0 . 3 0 4 2 一 
2 9 0 . 0 4 2 1 7 9 0 . 3 1 2 1 
3 0 0 . 0 4 5 0 8 0 0 . 3 2 0 0 
3 1 0 . 0 4 8 1 8 1 0 . 3 2 8 1 
3 2 0 . 0 5 1 2 8 2 0 . 3 3 6 2 
3 3 0 . 0 5 4 5 8 3 0 . 3 4 4 5 
3 4 0 . 0 5 7 8 8 4 0 . 3 5 2 8 
3 5 0 . 0 6 1 3 8 5 0 . 3 6 1 3 
3 6 0 . 0 6 4 8 8 6 0 . 3 6 9 8 
3 7 0 . 0 6 8 5 8 7 0 . 3 7 8 5 
3 8 0 . 0 7 2 2 8 8 0 . 3 8 7 2 
3 9 0 . 0 7 6 1 8 9 0 . 3 9 6 1 
4 0 0 . 0 8 0 0 9 0 0 . 4 0 5 0 
4 1 0 . 0 8 4 1 9 1 0 . 4 1 4 1 
4 2 0 . 0 8 8 2 9 2 0 . 4 2 3 2 
4 3 0 . 0 9 2 5 9 3 0 . 4 3 2 5 
4 4 0 . 0 9 6 8 9 4 0 . 4 4 1 8 
4 5 0 . 1 0 1 3 9 5 0 . 4 5 1 3 
4 6 0 . 1 0 5 8 9 6 0 . 4 6 0 8 
4 7 0 . 1 1 0 5 9 7 0 . 4 7 0 5 
4 8 0 . 1 1 5 2 9 8 0 . 4 8 0 2 
4 9 0 . 1 2 0 1 9 9 0 . 4 9 0 1 
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_ TABLE OF EIPERIRENTAL DESIGNS 
溢•糧GmL COST；) fHSOiEriaL 
^i-h KilHBEES PROB IiECISlON E即ILlMlii片 
1.Pairnse/noffiogeDOiis, 0.33 -40...40 g e2/10000 21 
sdtail prize-airr. 
2.Pairnse,ii0E0geii0!]s, 1.3] -40...40 g e2/10000 §3 
large prize dirf. 
3.Pairdse,heterogenous, 0.33 -40...40 g 
sBali prize dirf. 
lo呆 aWity. 6 2 / 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 ‘ 
•叫h ahiity 4 e2/2000 ii 
‘ 4.Pairdse,heterogenous, 1.33 -40...40 g 
large prize oiff. 
low ability e2/i0000 S3 
hi扑 ability s e2/2000 U'S 
5Jp/.V=i/4,S3all prize diff.. 0.33 -40...40 gH e2/10000 U 
6Jp/N:2M,siiali prize (iiff.. 0.33 -扣...40 g24 e2/10000 31 
二3/4,sfliaU prize (iiff.. 0.33 -40...40 g34 e2/i0000 16 
8Jp/{}=l/6,s®ail prize difi.. 0.33 -40...40 glfc e2/10000 b 
9.i�M:2/6,siaU prize difL. 0J3 -40...40 0 e2/i0000 25 
1 0 . s m a l l prize (iiff,. 0.33 g36 e2/10000 39 
llJ'p/]i--4/S,small prize difr.. O.j] -40...40 e2/i0000 U 
1 2 s n a i l prize diff.. 0.33 -10...40 g5b e2/10000 t 
prize (jiff.. ‘ 0.33 -40...40 gl8 e2/i0000 2 
U . s m a l l prize difL. 0.33 -40..JO 0 e2/i0000 U ；、— 
15.Sp/}f:3/8,s[!iall prize liiff,. 0.33 -40...40 e2/i0000 34 
1 6 . p r i z e liifi.. 0.33 -40...40 e2/10000 
n.lfp/H--5/ls0an prize difi.. 0.33 -40...40 g5« e2/i0000 ]d 
18J?/!j:6/8,s!iari prize diff.. 0.33 -40.. JO e2/10000 14 
J.p/H’=7/8,sciail prize iiifL. 0.33 -10...40 g/8 e2/10000 2 
20Jp/M/4,large prize mi,. 1.33 -40…的 e2/i0000 &2 
21.lip/li=2/ilarge prize mi.. I j ] -40..JO e2/i0000 丨 
2 2 . l a r g e prize diff.. 1.3] -40...40 g34 e2/10000 -
prize diff.. i J ] -40...40 gi6 e2/i0000 U 
24Jp/^2/6,large prize mi,. i J ] -40...40 g2b e2/10000 lU 
2 5 . l a r g e prize diff.. 1.33 -40.. JO g36 e2/10000 156 
26.Up/)i=4/S,large prize diff.. 1.33 -40...40 g45 e2/10000 104 
2].llp/ii=5/6aarge prize mi.. 1.33 -40...40 gSS e2/10000 2$ 
2 8 . l a r g e prize nii.. 1.33 -10...10 gl8 e2/10000 § 
25jp/}f=2/8,large prize diri.. 1.33 -40...40 g28 e2/iOOOO 55 
30Jp/li=3/8,large prize dirf.. 1.33 -40...40 giS e2/i0000 136 
3 1 . l a r g e prize diff.. 1.33 . -40...10 e2/10000 lU 
3 2 . l a r g e prize diff.. i.33 -40...40 gSa e2/10000 13S 
33Jp/lJ=6/8,large prize diff.. 1.33 -40..,40 gSS e2/10000 55 
34Jp/K l^/g,large prize dirf.. 1.33 -40...40 g]8 e2/10000 $ 
35.Score acc.,one-siiot 
a. el 0.33 -11...11 gli e2/10000 d^i 
b. e2 < 
36.Score acc.,sequential 
a. el , snaii prize (iiff.. 0.33 -il...ll gs+ 82/10000 
e2 , sEaii prize diii.. 0.33 -li...ii gs+ e2/10000 x 
b. el , large prize diff.. i J ] -lL..ii gs+ e2/iOOOO 气i 
.e2 , large prize diff.. 1.33 -11...11 gs+ e2/10000 % 
31.SBC,liigii ability 0.3341.33 -40...40 g nil OJi 
38.SlC,io¥ ability 0.3341.33 -40...40 g nil 0.?1 
^ the marginal probability please refer to epations c^-n") in chapter IV. 
T a b l e 1 . 1 
T h e v a l u e o f g . . i s c a l c u l a t e d a s b e l o w . 
P r o b a b i l i t i e s M a r g i n a l p r o b a b i l i t i e s 
N = 4 ; N 卩 = 1 G^ gi ,=3gG^ 
Nd = 2 G^+3G2(1-G) g 2 4 = 6 g G ( l - G ) -
P 3gG2+3gG2=6gG( l -G) 
= 3 1 - ( 1 _ G ) 3 
N = 6 / Np 二 1 gi广5gG4 
N = 2 G5+5G4(1_G) g 2 5 = 5 g G ^ + 2 0 g G ^ ( l - G ) -
P 5GV=2 0 g G 3 ( l - G ) , 
N = 3 G^+5G^(1-G) + 1 0 G ^ ( 1 - g26=5gGV2 OgG] ( 1 - G ) -
P 5G^g+3 OG^ ( 1 - G ) ^ g - 2 OgG^ ( 1 -
N 二 4 1 _ 5 ( 1 - G ” G - ( 1 - G ) 5 二20(1 - G ) 3 G g - 5 ( l - “ 
P G) ^g+5 ( 1 -G) 4g=2 0 g ( 1 - G ) ^G 
〜二 5 1 _ ( 1 - G ) 5 
N 二 8 ; Np 二 1 G^ giR=7G^g 
Np =2 g7+7(1 -G)g6 g 4 2 ( l - G ) G 5 g -
7G^g4-7G^g=42g( l -G) G^ -
N = 3 G^+3 5 ( 1 - g 3 8 = 1 0 5 ( l - G 广 
P G ) g6+ 2 1 g 5 ( 1 -G ) 2 Gg+42 ( l - G ) G ^ g -
7gG^+7G^g=105g ( 1 - G ) ^G^ 
N 二 4 1 - 3 5 ( 1 - G ) ^ G ^ - 2 1 ( 1 - g 讯 = 1 4 0 ( 1 - G ) ^G � - 1 0 5 ( 1 -
P G) ( 1 - G ) 6G- ( 1 - G r G ^ g + 1 0 5 ( 1 - G ) ( 1 -
G)7 G ) g + 2 1 0 ( l - G ) G ^ g -
3 5 G ^ g = 1 4 0 g ( l - G ) ^ G ^ 
N = 5 1 - 2 1 ( 1 - G ) 5 g 2 - 7 ( 1 - g = 7 ( l _ G ) 6 g + 4 2 � l - G ) 5 G - 7 ( l -
P G ) 6 G - ( 1 _ G ) 7 G ) \ + 1 0 5 ( 1 " G ) ^ G ^ - 4 2 ( 1 -
G ) ^ G g = 1 0 5 g ( l - G ) ^ G ^ 
N 二 6 1 - 7 ( 1 - G ) 6 g - ( 1 - G ) 7 g =7 ( l ~ G ) ^ g + 4 2 ( l ~ G ) ^ G - 7 ( 1 -
P G ) \ = 4 2 g ( l - G ) ^ G 
Np = 7 l - ( l - G ) ' 978=7 ( 1 - G ) 6g 
EXPERIRENTIL RESULTS: REOS m VUIAEBS 
isy DEciSiOfj m. Ek^  vuiAfjCE IN 
EXPERIKBNTS MEl REJECTEDiR) ilECISIOfi WUm 
, ACCEPTED(i) 
？(OMd 1-3 UrA 4 Ro'ind [-{ llo'iiid l-i So!jnd { Roind 1-4 
1.Paimse,ii_g_iis, 41.33 4U5 4 2 . R 丨队 9 IhA 
siari prize Qiff. 
2.Paimse/lioEogencii3, 82.3 n.m HAl k 1053 625.11 950J] , 
large prize diir. 
3.Pairvise,heterogenous, 
stall orize mi. 
io« abiiit? ] U 3 40J i tU.n m IH 
Mgh ability 65.3 k � . 1 111 
4.Pairvise,heterogenous, 
large prize mi. 
m ability 111 50 lU I 3S33 4625 3m 
high ability 128.58 丨3U3 121.54 R 1156.66 m M 1121.31 
Rouni 丨-2 RoBsa 3 Rouaii 1-3 Round Round 3 Mu 
prize difr.. 52.5 63.33 R 35?.56 516.38 
6Jp/}}=2/4,small prize difi.. 66.33 5iJ5 61.4? R 313.1 ail.15 535.15 
iJp/fl=]/4,33aii prize iifi., 51.56 UT) ilM a m.^) 45U8 604.3 
‘ “ Round 1-4 aonnii 5 Rouni 1-5 Round 1-4 Round 5 Round 丨 
prize dirt.. 32 . 33 15 21.81 I. m M 116.61 mSl 
'}Jp/N/S,saaii orize iirf.. ^l.n 41.bl il.fl R 506.4J 602J5 )h.n 
i0.flp/S--3/6,siali prize difr.. 40.42 31J3 35.5 F； 35U5 366.41 361.29 
llJD/M/6,sa3ii prize (iiri.. H.]] 20.4 I I t i n 100.56 丨 5 1 
i2Jp/N=5/b,SBail prize diif.. 25.5i 21.33 lU 358J3 
Roimi 丨-3 Round 4 lorn 1-4 Roiisd 1-3 RoruG { lord [-{ 
i3.!iWlj=i/8,SEaii prize difr.. ^ in 说 R 102].15 532J2 -
UJP/){=2/8,SE3ll prize diii.. 54 55J1 R 1316.25 • . M 1187.28 
i5Jp/H/^,saaii prize diff.. 54.42 55.13 5 5 . I 725.16 U1,U m , n 
H . m U l h m l i prize Qiii.. 50.25 队5 50.06 I m M 220.5 19M3 
I h u m i l m W mze diii.. 40.54 4U8 10.i5 � 16M3 U6J3 
18JP/N/8,SEall prize diii.. 30.56 111) 30.41 R UO.IH 120.18 
i5JD/M/8,S3aii prize diii.. 3U2 UA) ]U5 则.24 15b.15 2队Db 
‘ Round 1-2 Ronnd ] Um 1-3 Roiiiid 1-2 Round 3 Round i-3 
ZO.Np/H/llarge prize diii.. IIU 62.42 68J6 R m.32 H30.51 1116J] 
prize diir.. . ^hU 1 1 . 6 8 J I 〖 nlAt ？.112 bl^ .bb 
22Jp/N--3/ilarge prize 5U9 S4J3 I 56U5 MAI U1 
？(Oiad i-4 Imi 5 Round 1-5 loui 1-4 Rowd 5 km 1-5 
23Jp/M/6,large prize mi.. 
l U m i ^ M m prize diff.. 63.25 13.31 65.] R m . l l 如.2i 
25.}jp/1=3/6/iarge prize Qitf.. 55.11 51.13 581.28 583.41 
prize diif.. 66.5 li.5 a 255.1^  2.88J5 
prize dift.. 10.5 ？U? n.23 R 體 
^ i i n 4J.33 41.2 R 453.22 355.22 
Round 1-3 km 4 Round l-i Round 1-3 Round 4 Round 1-4 
U,m--mrhm prize diii.. 11.21 R m M Un 505.41 
25JP/N/3,large Drue diii.. 儿 125 I 'AlU 413J6 4队44 
30Jp/li--3/8/iarge prize Qiii.. 88.4 R 3128 Uli 
]iJp/N/«,large prize diii.. (队S 51.2 i im 2410 i860 
32Jp/S=5/8,large prize dirf.. 83.1 R 867.19 
33JD/H/8,une Drize ^lii.. "^OJi 56.S3 59.5 i 帕 
34jp/M/8aarge prize Giii.. 36.25 ]1M I lllH mM 
ilouni i-3 Mu { Ronrid 丨-4 Um i-i km { Round 1-4 
y j ] 仇 i ] fei.l I 3 5 2 , 1 ; 丨 3 1 1 
o^iind 丨-i o^iini I ？o:]ai i-4 ；-： -ri-i i ？frid ：-i 
( ^ '' A •>,*>,"• 广，..，•;... V.，• - • 
v' V . 0 L i r ' 】 … … 〕 。 广 : u •.丄二 
•^ei ,s3dii prize Gii:.. ]5./ ii is.ii) iCi^  t u b ^ U . n 
e2 ,syil prize diii.. i i i x x x 
b.ei ,large prize (iiir.. 53.3 .2 J A i ][)1J4 
e2 ,large prize (iiii.. x x x x x x 
Berore lasc Last ill rciads Beiore las： Last roii^ iis 
3/.SEC,iiigii abiliiy 0.7] (M 0J5 k 0.0 / 0.02 0.06 
ability 0.11 0.«i 0.11 k 0.05 O.Oo 0.05 
f 





0 II~L_I_LJ»»II T^^ I««I1—JI • I I I I I I I L _ i — J I I I I IL-J 
5 7 8 10 12 13 15 17 19 20 22 23 25 27 28 30 32 34 
6 9 11 14 16 18 21 24 26 29 31 33 
Theoretical means Experimental means 
TABLE 3A 
COMPARISON OF INC腿ENTAL MEANS BY WORKER SIZB 漏 PROMOT腿 CLASS SIZE 
� � � � - ( 5 ) (6) (7) (8) 
Theoretical Experimental Same ( � - � ) / � Avg. X diff. 
Sxper i ien ts means Difference means Difference sign(+) (in absolute value) 
Group 1 
5 16 56.11 
8 6 -10 27.87 -28.2 + 1.824 ‘ 
13 I -4 69.56 41.69 -11.4225 
20 62 68.88 6.62325 
23 26 -36 65.3 -3.58 + -0.90111 
28 9 -17 74.03 8.73 -1.51353 
1.20732 
Group 2 
6 31 61.47 
9 26 - 5 m i -13.6 + 1,72 
H 14 -12 55.81 7.94 -1.66167 
21 125 m i 1.69083 
24 104 -21 61.13 -7.68 + -0.63429 
29 55 -49 67.85 6.72 -1.13714 
0.88571 
Group 3 ；’ 
7 16 47.58 
10 39 23 39.9 -7.68 -1.33304 
15 34 -5 55,59 15.69 -4.138 
22 62 59.47 2.73552 
25 156 94 71,5 12.03 + -0.87202 
30 m -20 83.4 11,9 -1,595 
1.23351 
Group 4 
11 26 20.4 ‘ 
18 45 19 50.08 29.66 + 0.561053 
28 104 71,23 
31 182 78 82.6 11.37 + -0.85423 
Group 5 
12 6 24.7 
17 34 28 40.75 16.05 + 4 4 2 6 7 9 
27 26 71.23 
32 136 110 77.5 6.27 + -0.943 
I
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TABLE 
COMPARTSON OF INCREMENTAL MEMS BY WORM SIZE AND PROMOTION CLASS SIZE 
⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ （5) (61 (7) (8) 
Theoretical Experimental Same ( ( 5 ) - � ) / � Avg. % diff. 
Experiments means Difference means Difference s i g n � 
Group 1 
5 39 58.11 ‘ 
8 20 -19 27.87 -28.2 + 0.486318 
13 8 -12 69.56 41.69 -4.47417 
20 55 68.86 2,48024 
23 26 -29 65.3 -3.56 + -0.87724 
28 10 -16 74.03 8.73 -1.54582 
1.21143 
Group 2 
6 43 61.47 
9 54 11 47.87 -13.6 + -2.23638 
14 34 -卻 55.81 7.94 -1.397 
21 78 68^1 1,81668 
24 81 3 61.13 -7.68 + -3.56 
29 48 -33 , 67.85 6.72 -1.20364 
2.38182 � ‘ 
Group 3 
7 12 47.56 
10 54 42 39.9 -7.66 -1.18238 
15 64 10 55.59 15.69 0.569 
22 30 59,47 0.87569 
25 9? 67 71.5 12.03 + -0.82045 
30 100 3 83.4 11.9 2,966687 
1.89358 一 
Group 4 " 
11 23 20.4 
16 63 40 50.06 E 6 6 + -0.2585 
26 54 71.23 
31 113 59 82.6 11.37 + -0.80729 
Group 5 
12 4 24.7 
17 34 30 40.75 16.05 + -0.465 
27 12 71.23 
32 74 62 77.5 6.27 + -0.89887 
/丨 
TABLE 3B.1 
COMPARISON OF IMEMENTAL MEANS BY WORKER SIZE AND PROMOTION CLASS SIZE 
⑴ 一 ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ （5) (61 (?) 
B i p e r k e n t s Theoretical Experimental Same ( � - � ) / � Avg. \ diff. 
means Differences means Differences sign(+) 
5 39 0 56.11 0 
6 43 K 61.47 5.36 + 0.34 
7 12 -31 47.56 -13.91 + -0.55129 ‘ 
8 卻 0 27.87 0 0.445645 
9 54 34 47.87 20 + 0 
10 54 0 39.9 -7.97 0 
11 23 -31 20.4 -19.5 + 4 3 7 0 9 ? 
‘ 1 2 4 -19 24.7 4.3 -1.22632 
13 8 0 69.58 0 0.399321 
14 34 26 55.81 -13.75 -1.52885 
15 64 30 55.59 -0.22 -1.00733 
16 63 - I 50.06 -5.53 4.53 
17 34 -29 40.75 -9.31 + -0.67897 
18 10 -24 30.41 -10.34 + -0.5691? 
19 1 - 9 36.25 5.84 - l . W , , 
20 55 0 68.88 0 1.腳 533 
21 78 23 68.81 -0.05 + -1.00217 
22 30 -48 59.47 -9.34 + -^.80542 
23 26 0 65.3 0 0.903795 
24 81 55 61.13 -4.17 -1.07582 
25 97 16 71.5 10.37 + H).35188 
26 54 -43 71.23 -0.27 + -0.99372 ‘ 
27 12 -42 47.2 -24.03 + -0.42788 
28 10 0 74.03 0 0.712318 
29 48 38 67.85 -6.18 -1.18263 
30 100 52 83,4 15.55 + -0.700% 
31 113 13 82.6 -0.8 -1.06154 
32 74 -39 77.5 -5.1 + -0.86923 
33 26 -48 59.5 -18 + -0.625 




Tournament is a young theory because formal discussion on it began only about ten 
years ago. 
In this thesis, I tried to put this into a more realistic situation. This approach is 
obviously based on the idea that tournament, being an incentive device，may have another 
negative or positive effect on other aspects such as the accumulation of human capital 
Under the case with tournament and human captial，the equilibrium wages and human 
capital profile will be different from the results generated from the standard human capital 
theory. The main difference is that the equilibrium wage profile no longer rises and falls in 
the same direction as the human capital profile. More specifically，the wage profile will rise 
later than that of the human capital profile. 
Besides, I also tried to put the promotion theories into experiments. This is the first 
attempt to test these theories. The main concern is on the relation between equilibrium effort 
levels and promotion settings. The objective is to find out how the effort levels changes when 
the numbers of competitors and winners change. Although, in general，not all the 
experimental results in the present experiments are consistent with prediction, some of them 
did. 
In summary, although the works done here is tentative，there are more rigorous 
models on the relevant theories about tournament. Besides, the experiments made are based 
on some new theories. Hence, the experiments can he regarded as pioneering. 
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